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INTRODUCTION
As anyone who reads Sports Illustrated' or watches the Oscars-
let alone follows trends in environmental science, policy, or law-
knows, anthropogenic global climate change2 is a very big problem.
Scientists predict that in California, the state on which this article
focuses, unchecked climate change would decimate water supplies,
intensify heat waves, accelerate coastal erosion, degrade air quality,
increase wildfires, and reduce wildlife habitat, among other
impacts.3  Similar consequences are likely worldwide.4  These
impacts threaten to create major social and economic costs, 5 and
although climate change will probably affect almost everyone, the
burdens for low-income or otherwise vulnerable communities are
likely to be particularly heavy.6
Those threats have led to widespread academic and, increasingly,
1. See Alexander Wolff, Going, Going Green, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, March 6, 2007, available
at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/more/03/06/ecoO3l2/index.html.
2. This Article refers to "climate change," which encompasses both higher temperatures
and changed storm and precipitation patterns, rather than using the narrower term "global
warming." In most popular discussions, however, the terms are used interchangeably.
3. See, e.g., CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE CTR., OUR CHANGING CLIMATE: ASSESSING THE RISKS TO
CALIFORNIA 2 (2006) [hereinafter OUR CHANGING CLIMATE]; CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
CLIMATE ACTION TEAM REPORT TO GOVERNOR SCHWARZENEGGER AND THE LEGISLATURE 5
(2006) ("[G]lobal warming will impose compelling and extraordinary impacts on
California....").
4. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 12 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC, THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS] (describing some of the expected effects of climate change);
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY (2007) [hereinafter IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION,
AND VULNERABILITY]; Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1455 (2007) ("The harms
associated with climate change are serious and well recognized.").
5. See IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 4; see CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 38501(a), (b) (West Supp. 2007); see also An Open Letter from California
Economists to Governor Schwarzenegger and California Legislators (Aug. 2006),
http://calclimate.berkeley.edu/CAEconomists Letter.pdf ("California's economy is
vulnerable to climate change impacts, including changes in water availability, agricultural
productivity, electricity demand, health stresses, environmental hazards, and sea level.").
6. See REDEFINING PROGRESS, CLIMATE CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA: HEALTH, ECONOMIC AND
EQUITY IMPACTS (2006); see also IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, supra note
4, at 19 (observing that factors like poverty can limit adaptive capacity); Julie Eilperin,
Military Sharpens Focus on Climate Change, WASHINGTON POST, April 15, 2007, at A06
(discussing the U.S. military's fears that climate change will exacerbate strife in politically
unstable areas).
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political interest in developing new legal mechanisms for
addressing climate change. Many states now are acting;' Congress
has begun considering proposed legislation;8  international
discussions continue; and academic and popular commentary
increasingly focus on potential new responses at all levels of
government. Nothing in this article questions the importance of
such innovations or the need for new national and international
approaches. The central thesis of this article, however, is that
existing provisions of some old, familiar laws also can help.
Specifically, this article discusses one such law.9 After providing
background discussion of the causes and effects of climate change
and of existing regulatory efforts, it explains how the California
Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"),'0 a somewhat typical
environmental assessment statute, can limit the emissions that
drive climate change. 12  CEQA requires that California's state and
7. See infra Part II.B.3; see also Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of
the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183 (2005) (describing state
programs and exploring why states are taking the lead); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct.
1438 (2007) (lawsuit seeking to compel federal regulation of automotive emissions); J.R.
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change,
155 U. PA. L. REv. 1499, 1521-29 (2007) (describing state efforts, which the authors predict
will spur federal legislation).
8. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 7, at 1554-57 (discussing proposed federal
legislation).
9. This article focuses on CEQA for several reasons. First, California has led efforts to
address climate change-including the enactment of significant new legislation-and its
experiences can provide a concrete context in which to analyze the interplay between
environmental assessment and other regulatory approaches. Second, the relationship
between environmental assessment laws and climate change has quickly assumed
prominence in California, and its resolution of these questions likely will help define the
debate elsewhere. Third, some of CEQA's characteristics-particularly its substantive
mandate, its well-developed body of caselaw on cumulative impacts, and its history of
sympathetic judicial implementation-make it particularly useful for exploring the potential
benefits of applying environmental assessment laws to climate change. Finally, the state of
California is important in its own right because it has a huge economy and is a major source
of emissions. Additional discussion of climate change and the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA") may be a subject for a future article.
10. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-177 (West 2007).
11. Environmental assessment laws require an evaluation and public disclosure of the
environmental consequences of planned projects, alternatives to those projects, and
mitigation measures addressing the impacts of those projects. The evaluation and disclosure
must occur before the project can be approved. See, e.g., Nat'l Envtl. Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §
4332 (2000). They also generally include provisions allowing public comment. See, e.g., CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21003.1 (a), 21081.2(b), 21091 (West 2007).
12. CEQA also creates obligations for agencies to evaluate how climate change will affect
the environmental context of their projects-for example, whether other environmental
impacts will become more significant if superimposed upon a changing climate-but that
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local agencies identify and, if feasible, mitigate or avoid the
significant adverse environmental impacts of projects they propose
or approve." Climate change is a classic example of a "cumulative"
environmental impact, and CEQA requires identification of
projects' contributions to such significant cumulative impacts.14
Mitigation of those contributions almost always will be feasible;
between on-site changes and off-site measures, like purchases from
emissions markets, agencies should be able to avoid or fully offset
projects' emissions of pollutants that cause climate change. 15
Therefore, CEQA effectively requires that the projects it regulates
make climate change no worse. Whether this requirement will
translate into actual results is still uncertain, for actual results will
likely depend upon the nature of implementation and judicial
enforcement. The idea that CEQA constrains greenhouse gas
emissions is sufficiently new that no published judicial decisions
have addressed this issue,"' and many agencies are professing
confusion about how they should comply. 17 But on paper, at least,
the law imposes constraints that could create significant shifts in
actual practice.
The article then addresses a related normative question, which
has received little academic attention: can environmental
assessment laws like CEQA provide effective mechanisms for
responding to climate change?' 8 That question is highly relevant
obligation is not within the scope of this article.
13. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21002 (West 2007). CEQA applies to both government-
sponsored projects and private projects that require discretionary approvals from
government agencies. See Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049 (Cal.
1972).
14. See infra Part III.B.2.
15. See infra Part III.B.3.
16. One case that settled before trial aroused extensive political debate. See Mike Lee &
Michael Gardner, Brown's Plans for Emissions Disputed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, August 4,
2007, at A-i; People v. County of San Bernardino et al., No. CIVSS0700329 (Cal. Super. Ct.
dismissed Aug. 28, 2007). As of this writing, other cases are pending, but none has produced
a published decision. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. City of Banning, No. RIC460967
(Cal. Sup. Ct. filed Nov. 21 2006); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. City of Desert Hot Springs,
No. R1C464585 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 24, 2007); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. City of
Perris, No. RIC477632 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 9, 2007); Arcadia First! v. City of Arcadia,
No. BS108937 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 17, 2007).
17. See E.J. Schultz, Brown: Consider Climate Change, FRESNO BEE, Aug. 9, 2007, at BI
("Planners say they can't address climate change until the state Air Resources Board tells
them how.").
18. No published academic articles have discussed the relationship between CEQA and
climate change, and the author has found just one academic work-a comment published in
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and politically divisive 9  within California. California's
contributions to climate change are not small, and CEQA, which
applies to thousands of projects every year, could make a significant
dent in those emissions. But implementing agencies and the
judiciary are only just beginning to consider the statute's
applicability, and have not yet resolved whether its mandate will be
embraced or circumscribed.
The question also has broad relevance outside California. In
responding to climate change, as in many other areas of
environmental regulation, California has been a pioneer, and its
approach to climate change and environmental assessment law may
be imitated elsewhere. Mechanisms for such imitation are
widespread; legal systems in the United States and throughout the
world include laws like CEQA.20 Attorneys have begun testing the
ability of some of those laws to constrain greenhouse gas
emissions. 2 ' This article's analysis therefore applies, albeit with
1989-that considers (fairly briefly) the National Environmental Procedure Act and climate
change. SeeJennifer Woodward, Note: Turning Down the Heat: What United States Laws Can Do
to Help Ease Global Warming, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 224-28 (1989).
19. Non-profit groups, particularly the Center for Biological Diversity and the California
Attorney General's office, have filed multiple lawsuits challenging development projects
approved following environmental reviews that did not address climate change. California's
Republican legislators have retaliated by demanding CEQA exemptions, which Democrats
have refused to grant, as conditions for budget approval. See Samantha Young, Ca. Land Use
Dispute Complicates Budget, FORBES, July 26, 2007, available at http://www.forbes.com/feeds/
ap/2007/07/26/ap3956150.html. The Legislature ultimately resolved the impasse by
passing a law creating a narrow CEQA exemption, but not before delaying the budget for
nearly two months. Mike Zapler, Lawmakers End Battle Over Budget, OAKLAND TRIBUNE,
August 22, 2007.
20. See, e.g., Nat'l Envtl. Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §
8-0109 (McKinney Supp. 2007)); European Comm'n, Environmental Assessment,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/home.htm (describing environmental assessment
requirements in the European Union); Canadian Envtl. Assessment Agency, Introduction
and Features: Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, http://www.ceaa-
acee.gc.ca/013/introe.htm#3 (last visited Nov. 26, 2007); Jesse L. Moorman & Zhang Ge,
Promoting and Strengthening Public Participation in China's Environmental Impact Assessment
Process: Comparing China's EIA Law and U.S. NEPA, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 281 (2007); WORLD
BANK, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, OP 4.01
(2004), available at http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/
toc2/9367A2A9D9DAEED38525672C007D0972?OpenDocument; see also Environmental
Assessment in Countries in Transition, Legislation, http://www.ceu.hu/envsci/eianetwork/
legislation/index.html (last checked January 23, 2007) (providing links to environmental
assessment laws in former Soviet Bloc countries).
21. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., No. 06-
71891, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26555, at *101-38 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2007) (holding that the
NHTSA was obligated to prepare an EIS before setting new fuel economy standards); see
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some modification, to compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA")-CEQA's federal-law counterpart 22- several
existing state laws,2s laws in many other countries, and even the
operational rules of institutions like the World Bank.2 a It also can
provide guidance for jurisdictions considering enactment or
modification of environmental assessment laws.
The question is not rhetorical. The prevalence and staying
power of environmental assessment laws attest to their electoral
support, but their value has been vigorously contested, sometimes
in academic and often in political circles, since they first emerged
in the early 1970s.25  Disagreements about the wisdom of
decentralized environmental enforcement mechanisms 6_
mechanisms upon which laws like CEQA largely rely-also can be
intense, particularly if those laws would address geographically
Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Change and the Environmental Impact Review Process, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENv'T (forthcoming Jan. 2008) (summarizing litigation and development of
environmental impact review laws with respect to greenhouse gas emissions in California,
Massachusetts, New York, Montana, Washington's King County, and Australia, and also
under United States federal law).
22. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26555, at *101-38; Border
Power Working Group v. Dept. of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1028-29 (S.D. Cal. 2003)
(holding that failure to evaluate CO 2 emissions created a violation of NEPA).
23. See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENERGY AND ENVTL. AFFAIRS, COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS, MEPA GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS POLICY AND PROTOCOL 1,
http://www.mass.gov/envir/mepa/pdffiles/misc/GHG%20Policy%20FINAL.pdf (requiring
discussion of GHG emissions in reports for certain projects being reviewed under the
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act ("MEPA")).
The key distinction between CEQA and many other environmental disclosure laws is that
CEQA includes express substantive constraints; unlike NEPA, it is not "purely procedural."
Compare Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1989) with CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 21081 (West 2007). There are other differences, and a reader should be
aware that not all environmental assessment laws are the same.
24. SeeSchultz, supra note 17.
25. Most debate has focused on NEPA rather than NEPA's state-law counterparts. See,
e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U ENVTL. L.J. 333, 338-43 (2004)
(describing those debates); Robert W. Adler, In Defense of NEPA: The Case of the Legacy
Parkway, 26J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 297 (2006); Dinah Bear, Some Modest Suggestions
for Improving the National Environmental Policy Act, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 931 (2003); TASK
FORCE ON IMPROVING THE NAT'L ENVTL. POLICY ACT AND TASK FORCE ON UPDATING THE
NAT'L ENvrL. POLICY ACT, H.R. COMM. ON RES., INITIAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Dec. 21, 2005) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE] (critiquing NEPA, and proposing
changes). See Adler, supra (critiquing the revisions proposed by the House of
Representatives' NEPA Task Force). However, CEQA also caused occasional consternation.
SeeYoung, supra note 19.
26. This article uses the term, "environmental enforcement," rather than "citizen
enforcement," because many CEQA suits are filed not by individual private citizens or
citizens' groups but by professional environmental organizations or government agencies.
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extensive problems.27  CEQA thus exemplifies a potentially
widespread but probably controversial method for addressing
climate change, and one might reasonably ask whether the
potential environmental gains are worth the associated expenses
and disputes.
The article concludes that the potential gains are worthwhile,
and that CEQA's model, although not perfect, is very good and well
worth utilizing. As decentralized, adaptable legal mechanisms,
environmental assessment laws can influence and improve many
individual projects, creating environmental benefits that would
escape other regulatory approaches. And by allowing flexible-
even market-friendly-compliance techniques, laws like CEQA can
achieve those benefits efficiently. Because environmental
assessment laws are not comprehensive or cost-free solutions and
are usually implemented unevenly, their presence does not obviate
the need for complementary regulatory approaches. But those
complementary regulatory approaches also have flaws, and because
no single legal device is likely to provide an adequate response,
28portfolios of regulatory approaches probably will prove necessary.
Environmental assessment laws can contribute substantially to such
portfolios.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE BACKGROUND
A. A Brief Overview of the Problem
In the 1970s and 1980s, climate scientists increasingly came to a
troubling consensus.29 Carbon dioxide ("CO 2"), which the fossil-
27. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) ("Vindicating the
public interest .. is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive."); Massachusetts v.
EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2005) rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (SentelleJ. concurring)
("The generalized public good that petitioners seek is the thing of legislatures and
presidents, not of courts."); William W. Buzbee, The Story of Laidlaw: Standing and Citizen
Enforcement, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 201, 230-34 (Richard J. Lazarus and Oliver A.
Houck, eds. 2005) (describing controversies over and complications of citizen suits as part of
the backdrop for the Supreme Court's decision in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000)); Mark Seidenfeld &Jana Satz Nugent,
"The Friendship of the People": Citizen Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 269 (2005) (providing a qualified endorsement of decentralized enforcement).
28. See infra Part W.A.
29. For a concise overview of several decades of climate change research, see Spencer
Weart, The Modern Temperature Trend, THE DIScOvERY OF GLOBAL WARMING (2007), available
at http://www.physicists.net/history/climate/20ctrend.htm.
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fuel-powered economy was pumping into the atmosphere in
increasing quantities, creates a "greenhouse effect."30  While it lets
light energy into the earth's atmosphere, CO2 reduces the amount
of reflected heat released.3' Other gases create similar effects, and
some, like methane, have greenhouse properties substantially more
intense than CO 2.3 2  Consequently, scientists predicted that as
atmospheric levels of CO2 and other greenhouse gases ("GHGs")
rose, the earth's climate would warm.
Those predictions have almost certainly proven accurate.
Primarily because of fossil fuel combustion, atmospheric CO2 levels
have risen in recent decades and are continuing to rise. Global
average temperatures also have been warming for several decades,
and while warming earlier in the twentieth century was probably
natural, human activity appears to have caused the more recent
change.34 There is no real scientific doubt that anthropogenic
emissions will warm our climate even more if they continue
unabated into the future. 35  The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change predicts worldwide average temperature increases
ranging from 1.1 to 6.4 degrees Fahrenheit (with the lower figure
assuming efforts to minimize GHG emissions) by the end of the
3621st century.Those temperature increases will cause many major environ-
30. SeeJames E. Hansen et al., Climate Impact of Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, 213
SCIENCE 957, 957, 964 (1981).
31. See PEW CENTER FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE CAUSES OF GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE (2006).
32. See THE CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE CTR., MANAGING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN
CALIFORNIA 1-7 (2006), http://calclimate.berkeley.edu/l_Introduction.pdf. [hereinafter
MANAGING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS] (describing the impacts of other GHGs).
33. See IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 2 ("Global atmospheric
concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a
result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values .... ");
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446-49 (2007) (describing the rise in CO 2 levels, and
early governmental responses).
34. See IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 8; Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.
Ct. at 1446 ("Respected scientists believe the two trends are related.").
35. See IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 10; see also Naomi Oreskes,
Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCIENCE 1686, 1686
(2004) ("Politicians, economists, journalists, and others may have the impression of
confusion, disagreement, or discord among climate scientists, but that impression is
incorrect.").
36. IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 11. The IPCC's projections are
based on a range of possible sociological, political, and technological scenarios, some
involving higher emissions than others.
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mental changes, most of them undesirable . Rising sea levels
threaten low-lying coastal areas with flooding and increase their
vulnerability to Katrina-like storms. 3s  Extreme weather events,
including droughts and floods, will almost certainly occur more
frequently. 39 In combination with the loss of glaciers and summer
snowpacks in mountain regions, droughts will increase water
40shortages, disrupting both natural systems and human economies.
Rising temperatures will warm waters and shift climate zones north
or uphill, extinguishing species that are unable to migrate, and
facilitating the movement of others-crop pests and disease
vectors, for example-that most people would prefer to avoid.4'
Rising temperatures also can increase the frequency of extreme
heat events like Europe's heat wave of 2003, which killed nearly
15,000 people in France alone.42 Not all of the changes will be
negative; for example, scientists anticipate some increases in crop
productivity. 43  But in general, most human and natural systems
have attempted, sometimes successfully, to adapt to the more stable
climate of recent history, and a combination of changing
environmental norms and increased variability will do more harm
than good.44
Because changes already are occurring, total prevention of
anthropogenic climate change is no longer possible.43 But climate
37. See IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 4.
38. See IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 11 (projecting sea level rises,
but not including the potential effects of changing ice flow in Greenland or Antarctica.);
IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 9.
39. See IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 12.
40. IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 8-9.
41. Id. at 9, 11 ("Approximately 20-30% of animal and plant species assessed so far are
likely to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in global temperatures exceed 1.5 to
2.5 degrees C."); see also Wayne Hsiung & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 1695 (2007) (arguing that potential harms to animals are enormous).
42. See Myles Allen et al., Scientic Challenges in the Attribution of Harm to Human Influence on
Climate, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1388-94 (2007) (analyzing the heat wave, and concluding
that "it is very likely that human influence on climate increased the risk of the 2003 heat
wave by a factor of at least two, with the most likely risk increase considerably greater than
two"); IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 12.
43. See IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 11.
44. See id. (describing both positive and negative impacts).
45. See IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 4-9; AMY LYND LUERS &
SUSANNE C. MOSER, PREPARING FOR THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR ADAPTATION 3 (2006), http://www.energy.ca.gov/
2005publications/CEC-500-2005-198/CEC-500-2005-198-SF.PDF ("climate change is
demonstrably underway"); id. at 5 (table summarizing observed trends); id. at 6; CAL.
CLIMATE CHANGE CTR., CLIMATE SCENARIOS FOR CALIFORNIA 1-2 (2006),
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change and the resulting negative impacts are not all-or-nothing
phenomena. They can occur to greater or lesser degrees, and the
damage, therefore, still may be limited. 4  Limitations on GHG
emissions will produce lower temperature increases,47 which in turn
should alleviate the severity of climate change's adverse
consequences.48 Similarly, increases at the middle of the projected
range are less problematic than increases at the upper bound.49
Taking steps to limit GHG emissions, and thus minimize climate
change, therefore remains important. Incremental solutions can
offer far greater environmental benefits than no solutions at all."°
B. Climate Change and the State of California
While it derives from the aggregate effects of many local sources,
climate change is a global problem. Unlike most air pollution
problems, the location of GHG emissions matters little. GHGs
generally are sufficiently long-lived to disperse throughout the
atmosphere, and a ton of CO 2 emitted in California is therefore no
more harmful to California than a ton of CO 2 emitted in
Shanghai."1 The secondary environmental effects are similarly
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-500-2005-203/CEC-500-2005-203-SF.PDF
(describing observed trends).
46. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457-58 (2007) (finding causation and
redressibility because EPA's actions could reduce climate change, even if EPA cannot avoid it
entirely).
47. See CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE CTR., supra note 45, at 11 ("Regardless of which model is
employed, the warming is greater for the higher-emission scenario than for the lower
emission scenario.").
48. See Katherine Hayhoe et al., Emissions Pathways, Climate Change, and Impacts on
California, 101 PNAS 12422, 12427 (2004) (observing that impacts will be more severe with
higher temperature increases); LUERS & MOSER, supra note 45, at 3 ("the state's long-term
ability to cope with climate impacts depends on the pace and magnitude of global climate
change"); see also CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 38 (table showing degrees of
impact).
49. See CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 38 (table showing degrees of impact).
50. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1457 ( "Agencies... do not generally
resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop.... They instead whittle away at them
over time ....") (internal citation omitted).
51. See CAL. ENERGY COMM'N., INVENTORY OF CALIFORNIA GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
AND SINKS iii (2006), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2006publications/CEC-600-2006-013/CEC-
600-2006-013-SF.PDF [hereinafter INVENTORY] ("GHGs affect the entire planet, not just the
location where they are emitted"); NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN
ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS (2001), available at http://books.nap.edu//html/
climatechange/3.html ("If the average survival time for a gas in the atmosphere is a year or
longer, then the winds have time to spread it throughout the lower atmosphere, and its
absorption of terrestrial infrared radiation occurs at all latitudes and longitudes.").
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dispersed. Some locations will feel climate change's impacts to a
greater extent or in different ways than others, but few areas are
likely to be unaffected . Furthermore, because the sources of
climate change are also dispersed-no single country contributes a
majority share of global GHG emissions-comprehensive solutions
will almost certainly require international cooperation."
Nevertheless, some areas play major roles in contributing to climate
change, some areas will experience especially pronounced effects,
and some areas can make particularly important contributions to
climate change prevention. California fits within each of these
categories.
1. California's Contributions to Climate Change
California is a major contributor to global climate change. If it
were an independent nation, California would be ranked
(depending upon the study) as the tenth- to sixteenth-highest
GHG-emitting nation in the world.' Indonesia, with a population
of nearly 250 million people, emits similar GHG amounts, and
California's emissions are on par with those of France.
5
California's emissions exceed-by a wide margin-those of any
other state except Texas.56 And while California's per-capita GHG
emissions are among the lowest in the nation, those emissions
nevertheless have been growing. According to the California
Energy Commission, "[f] rom 1990 to 2004, total gross GHG
52. See IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 12; see also IPCC, IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 4 (describing worldwide and regional impacts).
To say that harms are global does not mean that climate change threatens the type of
generalized and undifferentiated harm that cannot support a claim for standing. Particular
places will be affected in particular ways.
53. See INVENTORY, supra note 51, at 20 (2006) (showing worldwide emissions);Jonathon
B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1961 (2007) (arguing that state-initiated efforts are likely to offer only slight improvement
and may become counterproductive). But see DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 7 (arguing
that state and local efforts may accelerate federal regulation).
54. The differences in emissions among the 10th through 19th-ranked nations are slight,
and a slight difference in calculations can create a seemingly large difference in rankings.
Compare INVENTORY, supra note 51, at i, 20 (ranking California sixteenth, while also counting
Texas, which emits substantially more GHGs than California, as a nation) with MANAGING
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, supra note 32, at 1-6 ("Only nine nations have greater total
emissions than the state.").
55. INVENTORY, supra note 51, at 20.
56. Id. at i, 14.
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emissions rose 14.3%.
2. Climate Change's Effects Upon California
California also will be harmed substantially by climate change.
Those harms are not unique and are by no means outlying worst-
case scenarios. Other states and countries will face similar threats,
and in some places-particularly places where resources are scarce,
weather-related disasters already are likely, or poverty and political
instability make social and economic adaptation difficult-the
consequences could be much more severe.5 8 But even if California
alone were threatened, the likely adverse impacts still would be
significant.
The litany of consequences reads like the script of a bad disaster
movie. Average temperatures likely will rise, particularly in inland
areas,59 leading to a long list of secondary effects. °  Air quality,
61already poor in much of California, will get worse. Much
precipitation that now falls as snow in the future will be rain,
increasing winter flooding, reducing spring snowpacks, limiting
hydropower generation, and cutting water supplies in summer,
when California needs water most.62 Cold-intolerant pests and
57. Id. at 8 ("California's GHG emissions are large and growing... they are expected to
continue to increase in the future under 'business-as-usual' unless California implements
programs to reduce emissions").
58. See IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 4; see also Jeffrey
Sachs, Climate Change and War, March 1, 2005, http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/
develop/africa/2005/0301sachs.htm (connecting climate change and political conflict);
Eilperin, supra note 6, at A06 ("The U.S. military is increasingly focused on a potential
national security threat: climate change.").
59. OUR CHANGING CLIMATE, supra note 3, at 2 ("The latest projections, based on state-of-
the-art climate models, indicate that if global heat-trapping emissions proceed at a medium
to high rate, temperatures in California are expected to rise 4.7 to 10.5 degrees Fahrenheit
by the end of the century.").
60. Id.; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(a) (West Supp. 2007) ("Global warming
poses a serious threat to the economic well-being, public health, natural resources, and the
environment of California").
61. OUR CHANGING CLIMATE, supra note 3, at 5 ("High temperatures are expected to
increase the frequency, duration, and intensity of conditions conducive to air pollution
formation.").
62. Id. at 6-7; Hayhoe et al., supra note 48, at 12425-26; REDEFINING PROGRESS, supra note
6, at 35; CAL. DEPT. OF WATER RES., PROGRESS ON INCORPORATING CLIMATE CHANGE INTO
MANAGEMENT OF CALIFORNIA'S WATER RESOURCES 2-6, 2-22, 2-30-31 (2006) [hereinafter
CAL. DEPT. OF WATER RES., INCORPORATING CLIMATE CHANGE]; CAL. DEPT. OF WAATER RES.,
CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2005 at 4-32 (2006) ("Predictions include increased
temperature, reductions to Sierra snowpack, earlier snowmelt, and a rise in sea level,
although the extent and timing of the changes remain uncertain. The changes could have
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pathogens may expand their ranges, damaging the state's
agricultural economy and threatening human health.63 Forest fires
probably will occur more frequently.6 4  Heat waves will become
more frequent, extreme temperatures will be higher,6 5 and those
rising temperatures will degrade many terrestrial and aquatic
ecosystems. Rising sea levels will increase flooding, accelerate
erosion, and leave coastal construction increasingly vulnerable to
66
storm damage. Those changes in turn will create major
consequences not only for the state's environmental quality but
also for its economy; many of the state's most important industries
are likely to suffer. 7
Those problems would strike a state already coping with difficult
natural conditions. According to the California Climate Change
Center,68 "[t]he state's vital resources and natural landscapes are
already under stress due to California's rapidly growing population,
which is expected to grow from 35 million today to 55 million by
2050." 9 Californians currently experience the nation's worst air
major implications for water supply, flood management, and ecosystem health."); see id. at 4-
32-36.
63. OUR CHANGING CLIMATE, supra note 3, at 9 ("Continued climate change will likely
shift the ranges of existing invasive plants and weeds and alter competition patterns with
native plants.... Continued climate change is likely to alter the abundance and types of
many pests, lengthen pests' breeding season, and increase pathogen growth rates.").
64. Id. at 10-11 (observing that global warming will "increas[e] the risk of wildfire and
alter[] the distribution and character of natural vegetation").
65. See id. at 5 ("As temperatures rise, Californians will face greater risk of death from
dehydration, heat stroke/exhaustion, heart attack, stroke, and respiratory diseases caused by
extreme heat. By mid century, extreme heat events in urban centers such as Sacramento,
Los Angeles, and San Bernardino could cause two to three times more heat-related deaths
than occur today."); see also REDEFINING PROGRESS, supra note 6, at 19-26; Hayhoe et al.,
supra note 48, at 12424-45.
66. CAL. DEPT. OF WATER RES., INCORPORATING CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 62, at 2-31-
32, 2-47-52.
67. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501 (b) (West Supp. 2007) ("Global warming will
have detrimental effects on some of California's largest industries, including agriculture,
wine, tourism, skiing, recreational and commercial fishing, and forestry. It will also increase
the strain on electricity supplies necessary to meet the demand for summer air-conditioning
in the hottest parts of the state.").
68. The California Climate Change Center is an academic research unit based primarily
at the University of California's Berkeley and San Diego campuses. Several of its reports have
been sponsored by California state agencies. See OUR CHANGING CLIMATE, supra note 3, at 2.
69. Id. at 2; see LUERS & MOSER, supra note 45. Luers and Moser warn:
Today's climate variability and weather extremes already pose significant risks to
California's citizens, economy, and environment. They reveal the state's vulnerability
and existing challenges in dealing with the vagaries of climate. Continued climate
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quality, with much of the state's population living in areas with
routine violations of federal and state air quality standards. 70 Water
allocation is chronically contentious.71  Past logging and fire
suppression have degraded forests, leaving them dangerously fire-71
prone. Other natural ecosystems are similarly strained, with
dozens of plant and animal species threatened or endangered even
under existing conditions. Even without rising sea levels, the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Bay-Delta, from which the state pumps
much of its water supply, would be highly vulnerable to flooding.74
All of these environmental problems create institutional, economic,
and political strains, in addition to environmental and health costs.
In California, litigious natural resource battles are ubiquitous.
While most Californians will feel the impacts of climate change,
these impacts are likely to be particularly harsh for the state's
poorest and most vulnerable people, many of whom are people of
color. In part, disproportionate impacts will arise because
adjusting to environmental change generally requires money and
insurance, and poorer people by definition lack the former and are
less likely to hold the latter.76  Geography also will exacerbate
distributional disparities. Some of the largest temperature
changes, and the risk of abrupt or surprising shifts in climate, will further challenge the
state's ability to cope with climate-related stresses.
Id. atv.
70. OUR CHANGING CLIMATE, supra note 3, at 5 ("Combined, ozone and particulate
matter contribute to 8,800 deaths and $71 billion in healthcare costs every year.").
71. See id. at 6-7 (describing California's water resources as "already over-stretched by the
demands of a growing economy and population").
72. See CAL. BD. OF FORESTRY AND FIRE PROT. & CAL. DEPT. OF FORESTRY, CALIFORNIA FIRE
PLAN 5-6 (1996), available at http://frap.cdf.ca.gov/fire-plan/ ("Deteriorating forest health,
increasing fuel loads and other factors have led to more intense, destructive wildfires;
unabated this pattern will continue."); Carl T. Hall, Raging Tahoe Fire's Roots: 150 Years of
Forest Abuse, SAN FRANcISco CHRON.,June 26, 2007, at Al.
73. OUR CHANGING CLIMATE, supra note 3, at 10 ("The state's burgeoning population and
consequent impact on local landscapes is threatening much of this biological wealth.").
74. See, e.g., Delta Levee Break Information, http://www.calwater.ca.gov/calfed/
newsroom/calfed NewsInfoLevees.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2007).
75. See REDEFINING PROGRESS, supra note 6. Internationally, similar disparities of impact
are likely. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 281, 288 (2003) ("The largest producers of greenhouse gas emissions are not
necessarily the countries that will suffer the most from global warming.").
76. See REDEFINING PROGRESS, supra note 6, at 16-19, 36-37, 57-58, 63-64. As the post-
Katrina flooding starkly illustrated, those problems can be particularly intense when extreme
weather events demand rapid adjustment.
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increases are likely to occur in California's Central Valley," which
already contains some of California's poorest areas, and poverty
could increase as climate change disrupts the region's agricultural
economy.78 The Central Valley also is already one of California's
hottest regions, and that heat contributes to one of the nation's
worst air quality problems.79
Though opposition to climate change regulation largely derives
from fears of economic cost and disruption, California's economy
actually may benefit substantially from responding to those
problems. California's Environmental Protection Agency
concludes that implementing climate change prevention strategies
could add billions of dollars in additional income to the state
economy.80  Independent studies support those predictions.
According to a recent California Climate Change Center report:
Globally, increasing GHG emissions are assumed to be essential to a
growing economy. This is not true in California. The state can take
an historic step by demonstrating that reducing emissions of GHG
can accelerate economic growth and bring new jobs.... California
can gain a competitive advantage by acting early in the new
technologies and industries that will come into existence worldwide
around the common goal of reducing GHG emissions."'
That message has resonated with state lawmakers. According to
the California Legislature, "[b]y exercising its global leadership
role, California will also position its economy, technology centers,
financial institutions, and businesses to benefit from national and
international efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases... 2
77. Id. at 9-10; see Hayhoe et al., supra note 48, at 12424 (mapping projected increases).
78. See REDEFINING PROGRESS, supra note 6, at 3-4, 41-50 ("agriculture... is a significant
source of employment for low-income groups and people of color. Shocks experienced by
the industry could disproportionately affect these communities."); see also OUR CHANGING
CLIMATE, supra note 3, at 8-9 (describing impacts to agriculture); Hayhoe et al., supra note
48, at 12426-27 (describing impacts to dairy and wine grape production).
79. See REDEFINING PROGRESS, supra note 6, at 19-35 (describing disparities in
vulnerability to heat waves and describing threats posed by increasing ozone (smog)
pollution); Hayhoe et al., supra note 48, at 12425 ("Individuals most likely to be affected (by
increases in extreme heat) include elderly, children, the economically disadvantaged, and
those who are already ill.").
80. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 65 (stating that implementing climate
change prevention strategies could "increase jobs and income by an additional 83,000 and $4
billion, respectively").
81. MANAGING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, supra note 32, at 10-23.
82. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501 (e) (West Supp. 2007).
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Governor Schwarzenegger has made similar statements.
83
Climate change thus poses a significant but partially redressible
threat to California. With consequences likely to strike across
much of California's landscape and throughout many sectors of its
economy, with potential harsh and costly impacts upon most
residents-particularly those already vulnerable to economic and
environmental risk-and with potential collateral benefits from a
vigorous response, climate change threatens damage well worth
minimizing or preventing. The key question, which legislators and
lawyers have only begun to answer, is how.
3. Existing Regulatory Responses to Climate Change
Despite the threats posed by climate change, federal action to
address these threats has been almost totally absent. The United
States has neither ratified the Kyoto Protocol nor advanced any
serious proposals for alternate international regulatory structures.
84
Domestic legislation has been similarly lacking; notwithstanding
recent legislative proposals, Congress, as of this writing, has
primarily thwarted efforts to address the problem. 5 Until rebuked
by the Supreme Court, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") declined to regulate carbon dioxide emissions,
instead insisting it had no power to do so.s6 And although the Bush
Administration now acknowledges the reality of anthropogenically-
caused climate change, it has placed its faith largely in voluntary
87
responses.
Unlike the federal government, California's leaders have
recognized climate change as a problem requiring a vigorous
83. Governor of the State of Cal. Exec. Order S-3-05 (June 1, 2005) ("[T]echnologies that
reduce greenhouse gas emissions are increasingly in demand in the worldwide marketplace,
and California companies investing in these technologies are well-positioned to profit from
this demand, thereby boosting California's economy, creating more jobs and providing
increased tax revenue .... ").
84. See Carlson, supra note 75, at 288-90 (describing the Bush Administration's climate
change policies).
85. SeeJonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the
Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295, 1329 (2001) (describing the
Byrd-Hagel resolution opposing the Kyoto Protocol, which the Senate passed by a 95-0 vote);
see also Carlson, supra note 75, at 290 (describing failed congressional efforts to address
climate change).
86. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1450-51 (2007).
87. Engel & Saleska, supra note 7, at 186; see MANAGING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS,
supra note 32, at 10-15 ("While helpful, there is no evidence that voluntary measures provide
sufficient incentives to attain the Governor's targets.").
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response. Many parts of California's state government have taken
major steps. The California legislature passed legislation setting
automotive emissions standards for greenhouse gases.8 s  In 2005,
Governor Schwarzenegger declared the climate change debate to
be "over" and issued an executive order targeting ambitious
reductions in the state's carbon emissions.8 9 In accordance with
the Schwarzenegger Administration's policy, many of California's
administrative agencies are studying ways in which those agencies
may respond to climate change. 90 The state attorney general's
office has attempted repeatedly to use litigation to compel
responses to climate change. 9' These efforts build upon earlier
achievements. In response to past energy shortages and severe air
quality problems, California implemented many measures designed
to improve energy efficiency. 92  Partly because of those past
88. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2007). The automotive industry
almost immediately challenged that legislation. See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep Inc. v.
Witherspoon, No. CV-F-04-6663, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26536 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2005)
(allowing environmental groups to intervene in the automakers' lawsuit); see also Christopher
T. Giovinazzo, California's Global Warming Bill: Will Fuel Economy Preemption Curb California's Air
Pollution Leadership?, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 893 (2003) (describing likely challenges, and arguing
that California should prevail); Carlson, supra note 75 (describing the legislation and likely
challenges). Other states have adopted the California standards conditionally, so that they
will become effective in the event of an EPA waiver. See, e.g., Green Mm. Chrysler Plymouth
Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007) (rejecting a challenge to
Vermont's adoption of California's automotive standards).
89. See Bill Blakemore, Schwarzenator v. Bush: Global Warming Debate Heats Up, ABC NEWS,
August 30, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/US/GlobalWarming/story?id=2374968&page=l
("'I say the [global warming] debate is over. We know the science,' Schwarzenegger declared
forcefully at a recent United Nations summit. 'We see the threat, and we know the time for
action is now.'") (brackets in original); Exec. Order S-3-05, supra note 83. The order states,
in part: "[T]he following greenhouse gas emission reduction targets are hereby established
for California: by 2010, reduce GHG emissions to 2000 levels; by 2020, reduce GHG
emissions to 1990 levels; by 2050, reduce GHG emissions to 80% below 1990 levels... "
90. See, e.g., DEPT. OF WATER RES., INCORPORATING CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 62. The
efforts have not been uniform; the governor's office recently proposed steep cuts in public
transit budgets, and many state agencies have proven exceedingly reluctant to actually
reduce their own contributions. See Rachel Gordon, Governor's Budget Plan Diverts Millions
from Public Transit, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 16, 2007, at BI.
91. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438; Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., No. 06-71891, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26555 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2007)
(upholding challenges brought by California, several other states, and environmental
groups); California v. General Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (dismissing a nuisance case against automakers); Connecticut v.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing a nuisance case against
power companies).
92. See INVENTORY, supra note 51, at i, 12-13 ("California's ability to slow the rate of
growth of GHG emissions is largely due to the success of its energy efficiency and renewable
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measures, Californians' per capita GHG emissions now are lower
than those of most Americans, even though their aggregate
emissions are still growing.9'
Adding to those efforts, the California Legislature recently
enacted, and Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law, AB 32,
also known as the California Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006. This landmark statute is designed to reduce California's
greenhouse gas emissions. 94  AB 32 requires the California Air
Resources Board ("CARB") to cap statewide emissions at 1990
levels. 9' It empowers CARB to use a variety of regulatory
mechanisms to achieve compliance with that cap by 2020, if not
sooner.9 6 AB 32 also requires CARB to establish a monitoring and
enforcement system and empowers CARB to take immediate steps
to limit high-emitting sources. 97 The legislature left most of the
other details to the agency's discretion; the statute specifically
directs CARB to avoid environmental injustice in implementing its
measures, but the program otherwise will take shape primarily
through rulemaking processes.98
Enacting AB 32 was a dramatic step.9 No other state has a law
like it,'00 and the federal government has taken only preliminary
energy programs and a commitment to clean air and clean energy.").
93. Id.
94. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. 488 (West)
(codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99 (West 2006 & Supp. 2007)).
95. Id. §§ 38550-51.
96. Id. §§ 38560-65.
97. Id. § 38530. That provision already has proved controversial. In June, 2007, two
CARB officials were fired and blamed their dismissal on conflicts over efforts by the
Schwarzenegger administration to slow implementation of AB 32. Greg Lucas, Fired Air
Board Head Says He Tried To Keep Integrity, He Says He Lost Job for Proposing Change To Reduce
Emissions, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON.,June 30, 2007, at B2.
98. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38560-74 (West Supp. 2007).
99. See, e.g., Janet Wilson & Richard Simon, Feinstein, Boxer Differ on Global Warming, LOS
ANGELES TIMES,January 18, 2007, at B1 (quoting California Assembly Speaker Fabian Nunez:
"It's attracted worldwide attention, and it's landmark legislation"); Editorial: Fueling the
Future, SACRAMENTO BEE, January 15, 2004, at A4 ("The signing of Assembly Bill 32-
California's landmark global warming law-brought loads of publicity to Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger last year.").
100. Other states and cities have taken important first steps toward addressing climate
change, however, such as creating greenhouse gas registries or developing cap-and-trade
programs applicable to limited sectors. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 7, at 216-22
(describing various types of local measures); Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate
Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 54, 65-66 (2005)
(describing the "Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," an effort led by several northeastern
states); DeShazo &.Freeman, supra note 7, at 1521-30; Steven Mufson, Power Plant Rejected
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steps toward passing anything nearly so ambitious. '  Prior to
enactment of AB 34, California was leading domestic efforts to
respond to climate change, and full implementation could put the
state far ahead of most, if not all, of the rest of the United States.
Nevertheless, and as discussed more fully in Part IV, its enactment
is only a start. CARB's regulatory program has not yet taken shape,
and no one knows how effective it will be, or to what extent AB 32
will join a long list of environmental statutes that only partially
achieve their stated goals. 0 2 Because neither AB 32 nor any other
state statute purports to occupy the regulatory field, 0 3 both the
need and the opportunity for complementary approaches
therefore remain. As the next section discusses, CEQA provides
such a complementary approach, and exemplifies how
environmental assessment laws can bolster (or help compensate for
the weakness or absence of) conventional regulatory regimes.
II. EXPLAINING THE OBLIGATION: How CEQA ADDRESSES CLIMATE
CHANGE
A. CEQA's Requirements
CEQA exists to ensure that environmental considerations play a
central role in state and local agency decision-making.'0 4  Its
procedural and substantive mandates are designed to force
Over Carbon Dioxide for First Time, WASHINGTON POST, October 19, 2007, at A01 (describing
Kansas' rejection of a proposed coal-fired power plant).
101. See Carlson, supra note 75, at 288-90 (describing federal responses). Following the
November 2006 elections, several proposed climate change bills are likely to move, but
chances of passage of effective regulation seem slim so long as President Bush holds a veto.
See Wilson & Simon, supra note 99 (describing proposed bills by Senators Feinstein and
Boxer).
102. See infra note 233 and accompanying text; see generally infra Part IV.A (describing the
reasons why statutes do not achieve their stated goals); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 7, at
1522 ("California's 'cap' on emissions is, at the moment, more like a target, with
implementation strategies all but unknown."); Arnie's Uphill Climb, THE ECONOMIST, June 23,
2007, at 36 (describing the challenges of implementing climate change legislation).
103. See CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE §§ 38592(b), 38598 (West Supp. 2007).
104. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000(d), 21001(a), (d) (West 2007) (stating that agencies
shall "[d]evelop and maintain a high quality environment now and in the future, and take all
action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environmental quality of the
state"; "take all coordinated actions necessary to prevent [critical environmental] thresholds
being reached"; and "[e]nsure that the long-term protection of the environment, consistent
with the provision of a decent home and suitable living environment for every Californian,
shall be the guiding criterion in public decisions").
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fulfillment of that end. It imposes a few basic requirements, most
of which parallel the requirements of NEPA and other
environmental assessment laws. Any time a state or local public
agency makes a discretionary decision to approve or carry out a
project with potentially significant environmental impacts-even if
the project will be implemented by private parties' 06-the agency
must disclose any potentially significant adverse environmental
consequences of its decision."°7 It also must identify and discuss
measures capable of reducing or avoiding those adverse
environmental impacts.08  Unlike NEPA and many other
environmental assessment laws, which mandate only procedural
compliance, CEQA also imposes an express substantive constraint:
if mitigation or avoidance measures can feasibly reduce significant
adverse impacts, the lead agency cannot approve the project
without adopting those measures.' °9 If feasible measures are not
available, the agency must provide findings justifying any decision
to proceed with the project."0 The discussion below explains those
requirements in more detail.
1. Disclosure of Significant Adverse Environmental Impacts
If a proposed project may cause significant adverse environ-
105. See id. § 21080(a); Friends of Westwood v. City of Los Angeles, 235 Cal. Rptr. 788,
793 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the existence of any discretion in an approval process
triggers CEQA).
106. See Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972) (holding
that CEQA applies to private projects receiving governmental approvals).
107. CEQA does exempt certain classes of projects. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§
21080(b), 21080.14 (creating an exemption for "affordable housing projects in urbanized
areas").
108. Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry, 876 P.2d 505, 516-17 (Cal. 1994).
109. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081. In practice, the differences may be smaller. NEPA
lead agencies often will implement mitigation measures to avoid the procedural cost of EIS
preparation, and thus substantive change sometimes will occur without an explicit
substantive obligation. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing the Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 932-37 (2002)
(describing the prevalent use of the mitigated finding of no significant impact). Compliance
with CEQA's substantive mandate is generally reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion
standard, creating a heavy burden for plaintiffs challenging alleged substantive non-
compliance. See City of Marina v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 138 P.3d 692, 710 (Cal.
2006) (explaining that a decision about the sufficiency of mitigation measures "lies at the
core of the lead agency's discretionary responsibility under CEQA and is, for that reason, not
lightly to be overturned.").
110. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081(b).
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mental impacts,"' CEQA requires the lead agency," 2 before
approving or carrying out the project, to either prepare an
"environmental impact report" ("EIR") " 3 or require project
changes that will avoid or fully mitigate that project's potentially
significant impacts." 4 The EIR, if prepared, must identify and
discuss the project's potentially significant adverse environmental
impacts. 115
CEQA defines "significant impacts" broadly and inclusively. A
lead agency must address not just impacts uniquely deriving from
its project, but also significant "cumulative" environmental
impacts-that is, contributions, even if small, to larger
environmental problems."6  Under CEQA, a project's cumulative
effects have a "significant effect on the environment" if:
111. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(f) (2005) (explaining the types of actions to
which CEQA applies).
112. CEQA defines a "lead agency" as "the public agency which has the principal
responsibility for carrying out or approving a project which may have a significant effect
upon the environment." CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21067.
113. CEQA sets a precautionary standard for requiring EIR preparation. CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 14, § 15064. See Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 864
P.2d 502, 506 (Cal. 1993) ("[A] public agency must prepare an EIR whenever substantial
evidence supports a fair argument that a proposed project 'may have a significant effect on
the environment.'"). EIRs are quite similar to the environmental impact statements required
by NEPA.
114. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15065(b)(1). Section 15065(b)(1) states:
Where, prior to the commencement of preliminary review of an environmental
document, a project proponent agrees to mitigation measures or project modifications
that would avoid any significant effect on the environment specified by subdivision (a)
or would mitigate the significant effect to a point where clearly no significant effect on
the environment would occur, a lead agency need not prepare an environmental impact
report solely because, without mitigation, the environmental effects at issue would have
been significant.
Id.
115. See Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry, 876 P.2d 505, 514 (Cal. 1994) (describing an
EIR as "an environmental alarm bell" and a "document of accountability").
116. This requirement is typical of environmental assessment laws. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §
1508.7 (2007) (defining cumulative impacts); D.C. CODE § 8-109.03(a)(8) (2001) (same);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-220(3) (2007) (same). Agencies also must discuss indirect effects
following from direct physical consequences. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15064(d) (2),
15358. That discussion should not be speculative, but where an indirect consequence is
foreseeable, the existence of an extended causal chain between project and impact does not
excuse the agency from discussing that impact. See Planning & Conservation League v. Dep't
of Water Res., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("We need not venture into
speculation. But CEQA does compel reasonable forecasting.").
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The possible effects of a project are individually limited but
cumulatively considerable. As used in this paragraph, 'cumulatively
considerable' means that the incremental effects of an individual
project are considerable when viewed in connection with the effects
of past projects, the effects of other current projects, and the effects
of probable future projects." 7
Such problems are common. Seemingly small increases in air
pollution can collectively add up to major regional air quality
problems;" individual projects that slightly increase noise levels
may combine to create intolerable aggregate effects;"19 and wildlife
habitat may slowly be nibbled away by the incremental incursions of
small development projects. Contributions to such cumulatively
significant effects can trigger the obligation to prepare an EIR, for
an agency must prepare an EIR if its "project has possible
environmental effects that are individually limited but cumulatively
considerable."'' 20  The EIR then must disclose those cumulative
impacts. 121
Judicial enforcement of those mandates has been rigorous.
California's courts have repeatedly emphasized the importance of
cumulative impacts analyses, cautioning that "[o]ne of the most
important environmental lessons is that environmental damage
often occurs incrementally from a variety of small sources. These
sources appear insignificant when considered individually, but
assume threatening dimensions when considered collectively with
117. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21083(b)(2) (West 2007). The CEQA Guidelines similarly
state that "'[c]umulative impacts' refer to two or more individual effects which, when
considered together, are considerable or which compound or increase other environmental
impacts." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15355. "While section 21083 governs the situations in
which an agency must prepare an EIR, its provisions have also been applied to the contents
of an EIR once it is determined an EIR must be prepared." Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v.
City of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 367, 370 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Laurel Heights
Improvement Ass'n, 764 P.2d at 278).
118. See, e.g., Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, 270 Cal. Rptr. 650, 660-64
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
119. See, e.g., Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 370-71; Grand Canyon Trust
v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (requiring consideration of the cumulative noise
impacts of additional flights over the Grand Canyon).
120. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15065 (a) (3).
121. Id. § 15130(a) (stating that agencies are obligated to "discuss cumulative impacts of a
project when the project's incremental effect is cumulatively considerable"); see Los Angeles
Unified Sch. Dist., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 370-72; San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City
& County of San Francisco, 198 Cal. Rptr. 634, 639 (Cal. Ct. App.1984) ("Part of [CEQA's]
vital informational function is performed by a cumulative impact analysis.").
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other sources with which they interact."''  The courts therefore
have required agencies to treat projects' contributions to larger
environmental problems as significant, even where the individual
project contribution would seem small in isolation.1 3  They also
have rejected a regulatory de minimis exemption from that general
rule, reasoning that such an exemption would contravene the core
purposes of a cumulative impacts analysis.1 14 Some debate remains
about where exactly the lower boundary of a cumulatively
significant contribution lies; though the rejection of a de minimis
exception implies that even tiny contributions can matter, the same
court criticized a "one-molecule" standard for air pollution.2 5 But
past decisions leave little doubt that CEQA's full suite of obligations
can be triggered even by a seemingly small contribution to a larger
problem.
CEQA's definition of significant impacts also includes impacts
extending beyond California's borders. While CEQA governs only
decisions made and conduct occurring within California, nothing
in its definition of significant impact allows agencies to ignore
impacts outside state lines. Instead, "CEQA requires a public
agency to mitigate or avoid its projects' significant effects not just
122. Cmtys. for a Better Env't v. California Res. Agency, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 441, 452-53
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002); see also Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield, 22
Cal. Rptr. 3d 203, 227 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Cmtys. for a Better Env't); Los Angeles
Unified Sch. Dist, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 371; SanJoaquin Raptor/Wildlife Rescue Ctr. v. County
of Stanislaus, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 704, 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Las Virgenes Homeowners
Fed'n, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 223 Cal. Rptr. 18, 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Whitman v.
Bd. of Supervisors, 151 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
123. See, e.g., Kings County Farm Bureau, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 660-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(rejecting an EIR that failed to consider whether project emissions, in combination with
emissions from other sources throughout the San Joaquin Valley, would create a significant
impact); Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 371 ("[Tlhe relevant issue to be
addressed in the EIR on the [plan] is not the relative amount of traffic noise resulting from
the project when compared to existing traffic noise, but whether any additional amount of
traffic noise should be considered significant in light of the serious nature of the traffic noise
problem already existing around the schools.").
124. Cmtys. for a Better Env't, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453-58 (following Kings County Farm
Bureau, which it described as "[t]he seminal decision," and also Los Angeles Unified School
District). Communities for a Better Environment invalidated a "de minimis" exception, which the
Resource Agency had set forth in its regulations, and also rejected a theory that would have
focused on the percentage contribution made by an individual project rather than on the
overall scale of the impact. That theory, the court observed, "contravene[d] the very
concept of cumulative impacts," for "the greater the existing environmental problems are,
the lower the threshold should be for treating a project's contribution to cumulative impacts
as significant." 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 455, 457.
125. Cmtys. for a BetterEnv't, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 457.
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on the agency's own property but 'on the environment,' with
'environment' defined for these purposes as 'the physical
conditions which exist within the area which will be affected by a
proposed project."' 126  That functional definition invokes no
political boundaries; if an area is affected, it is part of the relevant
physical environment.
2. Identification of Alternatives and Mitigation Measures
In addition to requiring identification of significant
environmental impacts, CEQA also requires agencies to discuss
ways in which those impacts can be reduced or avoided. Agencies
must "systematically identif[y] ... feasible alternatives or feasible
mitigation measures which will avoid or substantially lessen [a
project's] significant effects."'127  According to the courts, that
discussion of alternatives and mitigation measures forms the "core"
of an EIR. 1
2 s
By requiring analysis of alternatives, CEQA attempts to compel
agencies to consider whether different versions of the project, or
even different projects, could accomplish most of the basic project
purposes while reducing environmental costs. 29  Courts have
repeatedly stated that agencies "must describe all reasonable
alternatives to the project including those capable of reducing or
eliminating environmental effects."'130 No universally-applicable list
sets forth the alternatives agencies must consider; the scope of the
analysis instead is governed by project-specific circumstances, the
standards set forth in the statute, the California Resources Agency's
CEQA guidelines, and a "rule of reason."'3  Agencies often
126. Am. Canyon Cmty. United for Responsible Growth v. City of Am. Canyon, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 312, 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (italics removed) (quoting CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
21002.1(b) and City of Marina v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 138 P.3d 692, 703-04 (Cal.
2006)); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15360.
127. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 2007); see id. § 21061 (stating that an FIR must
"list ways in which the significant effects of such a project might be minimized" and "indicate
alternatives to such a project").
128. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Cal. 1990).
129. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15126.6.
130. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 139 Cal. Rptr. 396, 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977);
see Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 553 P.2d 537, 540 (Cal. 1976); Laurel Heights Improvement
Ass'n. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278, 288-89 (Cal. 1988); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14,
§ 15126.6.
131. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15126.6; Citizens of Goleta Valley, 801 P.2d at 1168.
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consider building in alternative locations,132  using different
infrastructure to accomplish project purposes, 3 3 or scaling back a
project's scope. 34 The sufficiency of alternatives analyses is often
disputed; project opponents assert that agencies exclude viable
possibilities or set up only straw man options and that judges are
excessively deferential in their review of alternatives analyses.
Nevertheless, in many EIRs, the alternatives analysis does form a
substantial component of the analysis.'
3 5
CEQA also requires discussion of mitigation measures.136  The
CEQA Guidelines describe several categories of mitigation
measures, including "avoiding the impact altogether by not taking
a certain action or parts of an action;" restoring the environment
impacted by the action; altering project operations to minimize the
impact; or-importantly, as later sections of this article will
explain-" [c] ompensating for the impact by replacing or providing
substitute resources or environments." 3 7  They also specify that
132. See, e.g., Citizens of Goleta Valley, 801 P.2d at 1171-75 (concluding that evaluation of a
single off-site alternative was adequate); San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v.
County of San Bernardino, 202 Cal. Rptr. 423, 428-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting an EIR
that considered too narrow a range of site alternatives).
133. See, e.g., County of Inyo, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 406-09 (rejecting an EIR for a water-delivery
project that failed to consider conservation as an alternative to increased pumping); Kings
County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, 270 Cal. Rptr. 650, 668-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(rejecting an EIR that did not provide enough data to facilitate an effective comparative
analysis).
134. See, e.g., Vill. of Laguna Beach v. Bd. of Supervisors, 185 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44-46 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982) (upholding an EIR that considered a range of sizes for a proposed residential
development).
135. Some NEPA commentators have argued that NEPA's alternatives analysis
requirement has essentially been gutted through non-enforcement, and that the federal
courts' rhetorical endorsements of alternatives analyses have not translated into actual
holdings. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, Comment, Defining the Project Purpose Under NEPA:
Promoting Consideration of Viable EIS Alternatives, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 599 (2003). Nevertheless,
many EISs and EIRs do contain extensive alternatives analyses. How often agencies actually
adopt alternatives is another question, but it seems plausible to hypothesize that CEQA's
mitigation requirement accomplishes much more than its alternatives requirement.
Inducing lots of small, incremental changes seems much more practicable than creating a
few big ones.
136. Save Our Peninsula Comm. v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d
326, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (citing CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21100, 21002.1, 21061); see CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(a) (2) (2005) (stating that one of CEQA's "basic purposes" is to
"[ildentify ways that environmental damage can be avoided or significantly reduced").
137. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15370. At the boundaries, the difference between an
alternative and a mitigation measure may be fuzzy, but generally speaking, mitigation
measures involve revisions within the same project, while alternatives involve fundamentally
different versions of the project. See Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n. v. Regents of Univ.
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"where relevant," EIRs must describe mitigation measures capable
of reducing "inefficient and unnecessary consumption of
138
energy.
3. Adoption, if Feasible, of Alternatives or Mitigation Measures
Capable of Avoiding Significant Environmental Impacts
To the previously discussed procedural requirements, CEQA
adds a substantive twist: the statute expressly forbids agencies from
adopting projects without also adopting feasible mitigation
measures or alternatives capable of reducing significant adverse
environmental impacts.1 3 9  CEQA, in other words, contains the
unequivocal substantive constraints for which many of NEPA's
critics have long pined.'4 0  "[N]o public agency shall approve or
carry out a project," the statute directs, if "one or more significant
effects on the environment... would occur if the project is
approved or carried out," unless the public agency formally finds
either that the impacts will be mitigated to a less-than-significant
level or that such mitigation is infeasible, but project benefits still
justify proceeding.14' The CEQA Guidelines repeat that mandate,
stating that the "basic purposes of CEQA" include "[p]revent[ing]
significant, avoidable damage to the environment by requiring
changes in projects through the use of alternatives or mitigation
measures when the governmental agency finds the changes to be
feasible.""4 2  Thus, if mitigation or avoidance of a project's
significant adverse impacts is feasible, an agency cannot approve
of Cal., 764 P.2d 278, 290 (Cal. 1988).
138. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15126.4; CALIFORNIA RESOURCES AGENCY, CEQA
GUIDELINES APP. F, available at http://www.ceres.ca.gov/topic/env-law/ceqa/guidelines/
AppendixF.html (last visitedJune 11, 2007).
139. Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 939 P.2d 1280, 1298-99 (Cal.
1997); see Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry, 876 P.2d 505, 516 (Cal. 1994) ("CEQA compels
government first to identify the [significant] environmental effects of projects, and then to
mitigate those adverse effects through the imposition of feasible mitigation measures or
through the selection of feasible alternatives."); Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 393, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (CEQA "require[es] public agencies to deny approval of
a project with significant adverse effects when feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation
measures can substantially lessen such effects").
140. See, e.g., Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA's Promise-Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533 (1990)
(arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court has gutted NEPA of its substantive requirements);
William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA at Twenty: Mimicry and Recruitment in Environmental Law, 20
ENVTL. L 485, 500-01 (1990).
141. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081 (West 2007).
142. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(a) (3) (2005); see also id. §§ 15002(h), 15021.
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the project without adoption of those mitigation or avoidance
measures. This mandate exists not just on paper but also in
practice. There is no real debate over whether agencies have an
obligation to mitigate: Courts have consistently set aside actions
that agencies attempted to implement without full mitigation.
1 43
Consequently, EIRs include, and lead agencies to routinely adopt,
long lists of mitigation measures.
1 4 4
That mandate extends to mitigation of contributions to
cumulatively significant impacts. CEQA requires mitigation, if
feasible, of all significant impacts, 145 and a cumulatively significant
impact is, by definition, a significant project impact. 146 That does
not mean agencies must fully resolve environmental problems that
their projects only partially cause; an agency may satisfy its
obligations by mitigating its own contribution.14  The agency also
may accomplish its share of mitigation in a variety of ways,
including participation in regional mitigation programs.14 But an
agency cannot simply ignore its project's share of a significant
larger impact. If a project's contribution would be incrementally
important and could be avoided or mitigated, the project cannot
proceed without such mitigation.
143. See, e.g., City of Marina v. Bd. of Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 138 P.3d 692 (Cal.
2006) (setting aside an EIR and project decision because the lead agency declined to
mitigate some project effects); Lincoln Place Tenants Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 120, 134-38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining and enforcing the mitigation
obligation); Woodward Park Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Fresno, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 102,
132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) ("The city must require feasible mitigation measures for significant
freeway traffic impacts, just as it must for other significant impacts."); San Joaquin Raptor
Rescue Ctr. v. County of Merced, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 682-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting
an EIR that described and adopted insufficiently specific mitigation measures).
144. See, e.g., Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544,
559 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) ("Cognizant of their heavy burden to mitigate under [CEQA and
the California Endangered Species Act], the City and Sutter fashioned an enormously
comprehensive and integrated mitigation plan.").
145. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081.
146. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15065(a) (3) ("a lead agency shall find that a project
may have a significant impact on the environment" if the project "has possible
environmental effects that are individually limited but cumulatively considerable.").
147. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15130(a)(3) ("An EIR may determine that a project's
contribution to a significant cumulative impact will be rendered less than cumulatively
considerable and thus is not significant. A project's contribution is less than cumulatively
considerable if the project is required to implement or fund its fair share of a mitigation
measure or measures designed to alleviate the cumulative impact."); see also id. §
15064(h) (2).
148. Save Our Peninsula Comm. v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d
326, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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B. Applying CEQA's Requirements to Climate Change
The CEQA provisions and principles above constrain state or
local public agencies' contributions to climate change, for climate
change is a cumulatively significant impact, and agencies'
contributions can feasibly be disclosed and mitigated. The
discussion below explains those obligations in more detail.
The discussion comes with a caveat: that the obligations exist
does not mean they are presently being fulfilled. While the
discussion below applies old (by environmental law standards) and
settled legal principles, the idea that CEQA constrains greenhouse
gas emissions is relatively new, and has only begun to be addressed
by agencies and tested in court. As of this writing, there are no
published decisions applying CEQA to climate change
contributions, and no regulations expressly address CEQA's
intersection with climate change. Analogous NEPA litigation is
developing rapidly but has not yet created a settled body of
caselaw. 149  The entire area is still subject to substantial debate.
Consequently, careful implementation and judicial enforcement
are not assured, and without such implementation and
enforcement, CEQA-based climate change analysis and mitigation
are unlikely to become prevalent. The underlying purpose of this
section therefore is not to describe existing practice or settled
climate change caselaw, though the discussion is grounded in
established principles. Instead, it is to describe how caselaw should
develop and agency behavior should change.
1. Government Projects and Climate Change Contributions
CEQA's threshold trigger is a discretionary state or local
government action with potential environmental consequences,150
149. The limited set of NEPA cases includes Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., No. 06-71891, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26555, at *101-38 (9th Cir. Nov.
15, 2007); Mayo Found. v. Surface Transp. Bd, 472 F.3d 545 (8th Cir. 2006); City of Los
Angeles v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D.Cal. 2007); Border Power Working
Group v. Dept. of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1028-29 (S.D. Cal. 2003); and Found. on
Econ. Trends v. Watkins, 731 F. Supp. 530 (D.D.C. 1990). Of these cases, Center for Biological
Diversity provides the most extensive discussion and the clearest holding. See infra notes 178-
182 and accompanying text. The remaining cases generally address preliminary motions on
issues like jurisdiction, and collectively the cases prior to Center for Biological Diversity did not
establish any clear legal rules on the merits of climate change-based NEPA claims.
150. See Friends of Westwood v. City of Los Angeles, 235 Cal. Rptr. 788, 792-93 (Cal. Ct.
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and much of California's GHG emissions derive at least partly from
discretionary government decisions.
Listing all public agency projects that emit GHGs would require a
book, but a partial sampling illustrates the extent to which
emissions follow from discretionary government action. While
vehicular emissions are partly the product of private choices, public
agencies plan and build transportation systems, and their decisions
strongly influence driving and transit use patterns.' 5' Local
government is largely responsible for land use planning, which
plays a major role in determining automobile dependence.152
Timber harvests, which release some of the carbon previously
stored in forests, are regulated by California's State Board of
Forestry. 153  Construction of methane-generating agricultural or
industrial facilities is typically subject to local land use authority.
State and local agency decisions help control the construction of
power plants. Government decisions also affect power demand;' 4
every subdivision, industrial project, or water project that public
agencies approve necessitates electricity use.155 Public agencies also
are major power consumers. The single largest power user in the
state, for example, is California's State Water Project, which uses an
extraordinary amount of energy delivering water to consumers in
App. 1987).
151. See, e.g., Cal. Dept. of Trans., About Caltrans, http://www.dot.ca.gov/about
caltrans.htm (last visited January 23, 2007) (describing Caltrans' role in building state
transportation infrastructure).
152. State and federal air quality planning already is highly intertwined with
transportation planning, and just as government decisions help determine how much
nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter cars generate, those decisions
also play a direct role in creating or controlling carbon emissions. See Envtl. Def. Fund v.
EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 454-55 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing these interrelationships); see also 1000
Friends of Maryland v. Browner, 265 F.3d 216, 221-22 (4th Cir. 2001); City of S. Pasadena v.
Slater, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. City of S.
Pasadena v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2002).
153. See Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 136 P.3d 821, 825-26 (Cal.
2006). That state regulatory power does not extend, however, to the national forest system's
extensive holdings within California. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
154. See, e.g., Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, 270 Cal. Rptr. 650 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (considering the environmental consequences of constructing a new power
plant); California Energy Commission, Welcome to the California Energy Commission,
http://www.energy.ca.gov/commission/index.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2007) (explaining
the CEC's role, which includes "[l]icensing thermal power plants 50 megawatts or larger").
155. See, e.g., NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL AND PACIFIC INST., ENERGY DOWN THE DRAIN:
THE HIDDEN COSTS OF CALIFORNIA'S WATER SUPPLY 2 (2004) ("According to the Association
of California Water Agencies, water agencies account for 7 percent of California's energy
consumption and 5 percent of summer peak demand.").
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southern California. 15  In short, governance and GHG emissions
are deeply intertwined.
2. GHG-Emitting Projects and Significant Environmental Impacts
Not all discretionary public agency decisions trigger CEQA's
requirements. The second element necessary to trigger CEQA's
disclosure and mitigation obligations is a potentially significant
environmental impact. 1 7  Projects causing GHG emissions create
such potential, for the collective result of those contributions is a
perfect example of the principle "that environmental damage often
occurs incrementally from a variety of small sources."158 What the
Ninth Circuit recently said about NEPA applies equally to CEQA:
"The impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is
precisely the kind of cumulative impact[] " that requires analysis. 15 9
Unless its emissions are effectively offset,60 every individual GHG-
emitting project contributes to climate change. GHGs are
generally long-lived and well-mixed, so there is no inconsequential
location or time for GHG emissions to occur, and each GHG-
emitting project inexorably adds to the worldwide total. 6 ' No
reasonable doubt exists that rising worldwide totals are already
causing, and will continue to cause, severe and sometimes
catastrophic consequences. 162  Although those individual
contributions might seem small, and articulating a causal chain
between individual contributions and particular storms or droughts
is impossible, scientists generally agree that the more GHGs are
emitted into the atmosphere, the more temperatures will rise, with
corresponding increases in adverse consequences. 16  In other
156. See id. at 2 ("The California Energy Commission reports that SWP energy use
accounts for 2 to 3 percent of all electricity consumed in California.").
157. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15130(b) (5) (2005). Subsection 15130(e), however, states
that for certain types of projects, an EIR need not address cumulative impacts previously
addressed in a prior EIR. Id. at § 15130(e).
158. Cmtys. for a Better Env't v. Cal. Res. Agency, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 441, 452-53 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002).
159. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., No. 06-71891,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26555, at *114 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2007).
160. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing offsets and other mitigation measures).
161. See INVENTORY, supra note 51; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1452-58
(2007) (rejecting EPA's argument that the contributions GHG emissions to climate change
are insufficient to confer standing).
162. See IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4; see also IPCC, IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 4; Oreskes, supra note 35.
163. See CAL. ENrVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 15 ("actions taken to reduce climate
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words, while scientists cannot definitively determine that an
individual GHG-emitting project raised temperatures by a specific
amount or caused an event like Hurricane Katrina or the American
Southwest's recent drought,164 they know that each GHG-emitting
project causes warming and makes such events incrementally more
likely. The increment may be small and its exact scale in-
determinate, but it certainly is real.
The cumulative consequences of those emissions are significant
because the resulting problems are huge. As discussed in Part II,
climate change poses an extraordinary environmental threat, with
the potential to harm multiple ecosystems, damage resource-
dependant economies, and diminish the health and safety of
millions of people in California. 165  While California may face
particularly acute threats, its likely burdens are not unique."' Every
project that adds new GHG emissions therefore makes a serious
environmental problem worse.
Those incremental contributions cannot legally be dismissed as
de minimis or inconsequential. California's courts have rejected a de
minimis exemption to CEQA's cumulative impact requirements
precisely because seemingly tiny contributions to an environmental
problem are often collectively consequential. The Communities for a
Better Environment court instead held that "the greater the existing
environmental problems are, the lower the threshold should be for
change emissions today can reduce the magnitude and rate of climate change this century");
Kirsten H. Engel, Harmonizing Regulatory and Litigation Approaches to Climate Change:
Incorporating Tradable Emissions Offsets into Common Law Remedies, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1563, 1590
(2007) ("each ton of GHG emitted by a defendant exacerbates the risks of global warming,
though it is impossible to estimate by exactly how much"); Allen et al., supra note 42, at
1385-94 (2007) (explaining that scientists can potentially provide quantified estimates of the
extent to which climate change increased the odds of particular outcomes, like a flood or
heat wave, but cannot state that some specific events or event intensities were caused by
climate change while others would have occurred naturally).
164. For this reason, and also because of the absence of regulatory guidance on this
question, some CEQA attorneys argue that trying to determine whether emissions are
significant is impossible or pointless. See, e.g., MICHAEL ZISCHKE & SARAH OWSOWITZ,
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT 6-8 (2007), available at
http://www.coxcastle.com/images/psattachment/attachment204.pdf. But a cumulative
impacts analysis requires a lead agency only to discuss individual emissions and aggregate
effects. There is no need to specify exactly how much difference in ultimate effects is
attributable specifically to one project.
165. See OUR CHANGING CLIMATE, supra note 3; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501
(West 2007).
166. See IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 12-13; IPCC, IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 4.
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treating a project's contribution to cumulative impacts as
significant." 
1 6 7
Nor can agencies claim that their emissions are insignificant
because they are addressed by other regulatory programs. A
project's emissions of air pollutants like ozone or particulate matter
may be treated as insignificant where the project's emissions are
accounted for in air districts' plans for attaining federal and state
air quality standards.'68 That approach, however, cannot yet work
for greenhouse gases because California does not have a "state
implementation plan" ("SIP") for GHG emissions. 169
The passage of AB 32 does not change the calculus. Because AB
32 does not mandate a plan for achieving safe emission levels,
California still will lack the functional equivalent of a SIP when
CARB finishes developing its AB 32 implementation program.
Perfect compliance with the statute would reduce California's
emissions only by approximately 25 percent, but many experts
estimate that an 80 to 90 percent reduction ultimately will be
necessary to eliminate anthropogenic climate change. The statute
therefore is best understood as mandating first steps-crucial first
steps, but first steps nonetheless-toward attainment, not as
occupying the regulatory field and defining safe emission levels.7
Instead, California's acknowledged need for drastic reductions, and
for "[a]ll state agencies [to] consider and implement strategies to
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions," 171 vitiates any argument
167. See Cmtys. for a Better Env't. v. Cal. Res. Agency, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 441, 453-58 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002).
168. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064(h)(3) (2005). As a practical matter, such
compliance generally means that emissions from any new source must be offset by obtaining
reductions in emissions from existing sources. See Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects v.
EPA, 643 F.2d 183, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1981) (explaining the Clean Air Act's permitting
requirements for new sources in non-attainment areas). CEQA's requirement of GHG-
neutrality therefore is fairly similar to the requirements that probably would exist if
California did have a CO, SIP.
169. Those plans generally are promulgated for pollutants listed under the federal Clean
Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-10. Greenhouse gases, however, are not listed.
170. See MANAGING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, supra note 32, at 1-4; Exec. Order S-3-05,
supra note 83; Thomas Wigley, The Kyoto Protocol: C02, CH,, and Climate Implications, 25
GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LETTERS 2285, 2288 (1998) (concluding that compliance with the
Kyoto Protocol's modest targets would fall well short of removing the human footprint from
the global climate). That does not mean these steps are not significant. Even partially
reducing a colossal problem can create enormous benefits, especially where the intensity of
that problem can increase or decrease incrementally. See supra notes 22-23 and
accompanying text.
171. Exec. Order S-3-05, supra note 83; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38592(a) (West
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that adding any new source, unless somehow offset or so small that
it is essentially non-existent,172 is concordant with some state plan
for achieving safe emissions levels.
Though climate change cases are still relatively new to the courts,
this type of cumulative environmental problem is not, and CEQA
decisions addressing analogous environmental threats support
treating GHG emissions as incrementally significant contributions
to cumulative impacts. In Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of
Hanford, a seminal cumulative impacts case, the respondent city
had approved a power plant project that would emit ozone
precursors.1 3  That plant's contributions would have had little
effect in isolation and represented only a small percentage of
regional emissions, and the project proponent 74 argued that those
emissions therefore could not be significant. 7 5  The court
disagreed. Noting that the small contribution would affect an area
already beset by excess air pollution, the court required the city to
assess whether, given that regional problem, the project's increased
emissions would contribute to a significant environmental
impact. 16 The court held:
The relevant question to be addressed in the EIR is not the relative
amount of precursors emitted by the project when compared with
preexisting emissions, but whether any additional amount of
Supp. 2007).
172. Cmtys. for a Better Env't, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 457 ("the 'one-[additional]-molecule'
rule is not the law") (brackets in original; quoting MICHAEL H. REMY ET AL., GUIDE TO THE
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT 476-78 (1998)).
173. Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, 270 Cal. Rptr. 650, 660-64 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990).
174. Because CEQA applies to private projects that require discretionary government
permits, often multiple parties defend the EIR. The lead agency may nominally be the
respondent, but the permit recipient often leads and funds the defense.
175. Kings County Farm Bureau, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 660 ("The DEIR concludes the project's
contributions to ozone levels in the area would be immeasurable and, therefore,
insignificant because the plant would emit relatively minor amounts of precursors compared
to the total volume of precursors emitted in Kings County."); id. at 661 (quoting the EIR's
conclusion that "incremental effects of the project studied by the EIR are not significant,
even though the cumulative ozone impacts of Valley-wide energy development might be
considered substantial.").
176. Id. at 662 ("We find the analysis used in the EIR and urged by GWF avoids analyzing
the severity of the problem and allows the approval of projects which, when taken in
isolation, appear insignificant, but when viewed together, appear startling.... [T]he
standard for a cumulative impacts analysis is defined by the use of the term 'collectively
significant.'").
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precursor emissions should be considered significant in light of the
serious nature of the ozone problems in this air basin.'77
That reasoning is similarly applicable to climate change. Just as
regional air quality problems derive incrementally from many
sources, and no one source in isolation would seem important,
climate change derives from the individually minor contributions
of thousands of projects and actions worldwide, all of which
collectively create major consequences.'78
The federal courts now have addressed similar questions, and the
case most squarely addressing the cumulative consequences of
GHG emissions has reached similar conclusions. In Center for
Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,7 9
California, several other states, and several non-profit groups
challenged the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's
("NHTSA's") approval of new fuel economy standards. While
slightly more stringent than existing standards, those standards
were much weaker than those the petitioners claimed were
possible. But in approving those new standards, the NHTSA
determined that even the possibility of a significant environmental
impact did not exist, and it did not prepare an EIS. 180 The Ninth
Circuit rejected this position. It found that the decision to select
the relatively weak standards, and thus decrease the rate of C02
buildup only slightly, could have potentially cumulatively
significant environmental impacts. The court remanded to the
agency for preparation of an EIS.' Center for Biological Diversity
involved strong facts-few government decisions have greater
implications for GHG emissions, and thus more potential for
environmental impact, than the setting of American fuel economy
standards. 182 The case nevertheless indicates that courts will apply
environmental assessment laws to climate change contributions.
Indeed, the court was emphatic in its holding, citing D.C. Circuit
177. Id. at 661.
178. Environmental policies and laws commonly contemplate the major consequences of
cumulative minor actions. This phenomenon, however, is by no means unique or even
always a problem. The same principle underlies our decision to go to the polls and protect
the right to vote.
179. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., No. 06-71891,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26555 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2007).
180. Id. at *124.
181. Id. at *101-38.
182. See id., at"104-05.
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Judge Wald's "prescient" warnings about incremental increases in
GHG emissions, including her statement that "we cannot afford to
ignore even modest contributions to global warming."8 s
3. GHG Emissions and Avoidance or Mitigation
Because discretionary projects contribute to the GHG emissions
that drive climate change, and because those emissions' cumulative
environmental impacts are significant, any CEQA lead agency must
also consider ways to avoid or mitigate project-specific
contributions to those impacts. 84 Both carrots and sticks back that
obligation. If, at the outset of the process, the lead agency
incorporates into the project description measures that fully
mitigate or avoid that project's potential GHG emissions, the
agency may avoid the obligation to prepare an EIR, and thus may
save substantial time and money.8 5  Moreover, unless such
avoidance or mitigation measures are infeasible, no CEQA-
regulated project may be approved without such measures.18 6 As
discussed in detail below, such measures generally are available,
affordable, and capable of generating collateral environmental and
economic benefits. CEQA thus requires lead agencies not just to
disclose but also to mitigate or avoid their projects' potential GHG
emissions.
a. Project Alternatives
For many projects, functionally similar alternatives can vastly
reduce GHG emissions. Renewable power sources, for example,
provide alternatives to constructing fossil fuel power plants.
Constructing transit systems often provides a lower-emissions
alternative to constructing new roads.187 Rather than building new
183. Id. at *115, 137 (citing City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 500, 501 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (Wald, C.J., dissenting)).
184. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21002, 21061 (West 2007).
185. See Karkkainnen, supra note 109, at 932-37 (explaining the appeal of using
mitigation to avoid EIS preparation).
186. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE. § 21081.
187. See, e.g., Letter from Bill Lockyer, California Attorney General, to Glenn Campbell,
Orange County Transportation Authority, at 3-4 (Mar. 30, 2006) (on file with author)
(identifying "[i]ncreased public transportation" as one of many measures capable of
reducing the GHG emissions from a new regional transportation plan); REDEFINING
PROGRESS, supra note 6, at 80 (summarizing community testimony from low-income Fresno
residents, who "noted that the development pattern forces people to use their own
cars...").
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water delivery projects, which tend to consume huge amounts of
energy, project proponents could implement water use efficiency
programs. 188  Instead of breaking new ground and building new
housing in undeveloped areas, local governments could focus their
land use approvals on infill development projects, which tend to
require substantially less energy-intensive infrastructure, or could
promote higher-density transit-oriented development.'89  Such
alternatives will not always be feasible-some projects may require a
particular location or design-and often environmentally-
beneficial alternatives still will create some GHG emissions.
Nevertheless, alternatives capable of substantially reducing GHG
emissions are often available.
b. On-Site Mitigation
Even if no alternative is capable of avoiding a project's emissions,
on-site measures often can substantially mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions.19 Developers can use green-building technology and
renewable power systems, and can build housing with ready transit
access and internal or nearby options for grocery shopping and
recreation, reducing their projects' energy footprint.191 A variety of
measures, ranging from water recycling to appliance standards to
tiered pricing, can reduce energy used to transport, distribute,
heat, and dispose water.'92 Highways, where necessary, can include
HOV lanes, and dairy farms and landfills can be constructed with
methane-recovery technologies. 93 These examples provide only a
188. See, e.g., ENERGY DOWN THE DRAIN, supra note 155, at 34 (describing the costs and
benefits of alternative methods of boosting San Diego's water supplies).
189. Many air pollution control districts already publish guidelines for development
patterns that minimize emissions of other pollutants and the same principles can help
minimize GHG emissions. See, e.g., SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DIST.,
RESIDENTIAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS, http://www.slocleanair.org/business/pdf/
residential%20flyer.pdf (last visited January 23, 2007); SOLANO TRANSP. AUTH. ET AL.,
TRANSPORTATION AND LAND USE TOOLKIT (2003), available at http://www.ysaqmd.org/
planning-info.php.
190. The distinctions between an alternative and a mitigation measure can blur.
Alternatives can mitigate impacts, and a large number of mitigation measures can effectively
create an alternative version of a project.
191. See SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DIST., supra note 189;
SOLANO TRANSP. AUTH. ET AL., supra note 189.
192. See ENERGY DOWN THE DRAIN, supra note 154 (describing measures capable of
reducing water use and explaining their benefits).
193. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Methane, http://www.epa.gov/methane/
projections.html (last visited January 23, 2007) ("for many methane sources, opportunities
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partial sampling, and as efforts toward GHG management intensify,
an increasing variety of mitigation measures will likely become
available.
c. Off-Site Mitigation
Sometimes neither project alternatives nor on-site mitigation
measures can fully avoid GHG emissions. But even for those
projects, off-site mitigation should allow projects to achieve GHG
neutrality. The primary available method is generally known as
emissions trading.1 94
The concept behind emissions trading is straightforward. To
compensate for increased emissions resulting from a project, the
project proponent can reduce its own emissions elsewhere, pay
some other entity to commensurately reduce emissions, or
undertake or fund actions that will permanently sequester an
equivalent amount of carbon. 95  For example, a municipality
approving a housing development with some unavoidable
emissions might require the project developer to fund a city-wide
energy efficiency program creating equivalent emissions
reductions, or might offset the emissions deriving from a new
transportation project by ensuring the conversion of cleared land
to a permanent forest.'
96
In practice, the complexity is greater than in theory, because
trading presents potential transparency and verification
problems.' 97  The basic premise of an offset-that it creates a
exist to reduce emissions cost-effectively or at low cost by capturing the methane and using it
as fuel.... EPA also provides information on cost-effective mitigation options for ruminant
livestock emissions.").
194. The term "emissions trading" describes both cap-and-trade systems (in which
emissions allowances are traded within a regulated group collectively subject to an emissions
cap) and offsets (in which regulated entities pay non-regulated entities to reduce their
emissions). Because CEQA extends obligations to emissions not regulated by a cap-and-
trade system, this article focuses primarily on offsets as a means of reduction.
195. See David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix? The Emissions Trading Idea and the
Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1998) (explaining the basic
appeal of emissions trading and discussing why trading schemes should be somewhat less
enticing than they superficially seem); THE CLIMATE TRUST, ABOUT OFFSETS: OVERVIEW,
http://www.climatetrust.org/abouti.offsets.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
196. See, e.g., THE CLIMATE TRUST, PROJECTS: OVERVIEW, http://www.climatetrust.org/
offset.projects.php (providing links to project descriptions) (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
197. See generally James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000) (describing common pitfalls of
environmental trading systems).
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different emissions pattern than otherwise would have existed-can
facilitate gaming and false accounting; calculating what would
happen without the offset can be a speculative counterfactual
exercise. 98 "Not-carbon," as one article recently described it, is a
difficult thing to measure. 99 Offset credits may support emissions-
reducing measures that would have happened even in the absence
of payment or legal requirement. 2 0  Similarly, offset credits may go
to projects that do not really reduce emissions. Growing a forest
provides no meaningful sequestration if the forest later burns, or if
the landowner simply shifts its logging trucks to a forest it otherwise
would have left uncut.0 1 Finally, some advocates fear that offsetting
may create distributional inequities. Mitigating GHG emissions
often creates substantial collateral benefits, and trading can
relocate those benefits out of the project areas. This can be
problematic if agencies or industries in lower-income areas
purchase offsets and retain carbon-emitting activities while entities
in relatively affluent areas prefer to sell offsets and reap the
associated benefits.02  Effective reporting schemes or vigilant
regulators could minimize those problems, but if either are
absent-and sometimes both will be, for offset markets are
presently self-regulated 2 03-the reality, and thus the legality, of off-
site mitigation measures may be difficult to discern.
204
198. See TONY DUTZIK & ROB SARGENT, STOPPING GLOBAL WARMING BEGINS AT HOME: THE
CASE AGAINST THE USE OF OFFSETS IN A REGIONAL POWER SECTOR CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM
9-11 (2004), available at http://www.connpirgstudents.org/uploads/Rg/97/Rg97OQbyPIA
jTJbKLxD6_Q/StoppingGlobal_ Warming.pdf.
199. Trading Thin Air, THE ECONOMIST, May 31, 2007, available at http://www.economist
.com/surveys/displaystory.cfmstoryid=9217960&CFID=9630437&CFTOKEN=30746497; see
Alan Zarembo, Trying to Buy a Greener Conscience, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 2, 2007 at Al
(critiquing voluntary carbon offsets).
200. See, e.g., Jeff Goodell, Capital Pollution Solution?, NEW YORK TIMES, July 30, 2006
(Magazine) at 36 (describing "offset" payments to no-till farmers who had been no-till
farming for years before the payments occurred).
201. See DUTZIK &SARGENT, supra note 198, at 10.
202. See id. at 16-17 (describing collateral benefits of GHG regulation of power plants);
see, e.g.,Jonathon Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography, Designing Marketable
Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 613-14 (2001)
(describing criticisms of the South Coast Air Quality Management District's RECLAIM
program). Those concerns should be much less salient with GHG regulation than with other
pollutants, for most GHGs do not pose health risks other than through their contributions to
climate change, which have little to do with their source location.
203. See, e.g., Goodell, supra note 200 (describing reservations about the Chicago Climate
Exchange).
204. See City of Marina v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. St. Univ., 138 P.3d 692, 707 (Cal. 2006)
(requiring evidence that mitigation fees will generate results).
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Despite those caveats, well-designed and transparent emissions
trades could fulfill CEQA's legal requirements. Though sometimes
subject to criticism, using offsets is already endorsed by CEQA'simpleentin , • 205
implementing regulations and is a commonly used mitigation
206practice. Additionally, agencies often mitigate project impacts by
207
contributing fees to regional mitigation programs. That
approach has parallels under other legal regimes. For example,
new projects in areas with deficient air quality often offset
201
emissions by purchasing reduction credits from existing sources.
Those approaches have legal limitations; a "commitment to pay
fees without any evidence that mitigation will actually occur is
inadequate" under CEQA, and fictitious or non-verifiable offsets
therefore cannot constitute legally sufficient mitigation. 209  But so
long as the reality of reductions or sequestration is verifiable,
emissions trades should pass legal muster. 210
Trading also can facilitate mitigation that otherwise would not
occur. Often neither alternatives nor on-site mitigation measures
can fully avoid GHG emissions, but purchasing offsets, which are
available from a growing number of providers, will be feasible.
205. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15370 (2005) (allowing agencies to mitigate impacts by
'replacing or providing substitute resources or environments").
206. Common examples of offsets include purchasing conservation easements as partial
mitigation for conversion of farmlands or habitat and constructing new wetlands to
compensate for wetlands destroyed. See, e.g., Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. City of
Sacramento, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 544, 558-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (describing typical mitigation
measures).
207. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15130(a) (3) (allowing this practice). Commentators
have endorsed carbon offset trading as a potential remedy under other legal regimes. See,
e.g., Engel, supra note 163.
208. See, e.g., Berkeley Keep Jets Over the Bay Com. v. Bd. of Port Comm'rs, 111 Cal. Rptr.
2d 598, 613 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (referring to this technique); Kings County Farm Bureau v.
City of Hanford, 270 Cal. Rptr. 650, 657 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (same); 42 U.S.C. § 7503
(requiring offsets as conditions for permitting new air pollution sources in non-attainment
areas); Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects, Inc. v. EPA, 643 F.2d 183, 184-85 (4th Cir.
1981).
209. City of Marina, 138 P.3d at 707.
210. Unlike NEPA, CEQA requires lead agencies to develop and adopt a "reporting or
monitoring program" whenever they rely on mitigation measures to avoid a significant
adverse environmental impact. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081.6(a)(1) (West 2007);
Karkkainen, supra note 109, at 952 ("this modest step represents an important conceptual
advance over the federal statute").
211. Already several private organizations are offering offsets, the Kyoto Protocol allows
emissions trading, and even small amounts of offsets can be purchased quickly, and thus with
minimal transaction costs, on-line. See, e.g., www.terrapass.org.; The Climate Trust,
http://www.climatetrust.org/index.php (last visited January 24, 2007); The Climate
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Under such circumstances, the availability of offsets creates a legal
obligation to implement mitigation that agencies otherwise could
write off as impossible. 12 Similarly, reluctant agencies and project
proponents may sometimes contend that a project's climate change
contributions are too small to justify full-scale environmental review
or the expense of on-site mitigation. But trading creates a
correspondingly non-intrusive method for addressing such minor
emissions. If a project's emissions contributions really are small, so
too will be the cost of purchasing offsets, and the agency should be
able to cheaply mitigate its impacts, potentially even avoiding the
obligation to prepare an EIR.213  By expanding the realm of the
feasible, trading can expand mitigation obligations, potentially
minimizing emissions that otherwise would be unrestrained.
III. EVALUATING THE OBLIGATION: SHOULD CEQA ADDRESS
CLIMATE CHANGE?
The basic point of the foregoing discussion is that CEQA requires
California's state and local agencies to eliminate or offset GHG
emissions from projects they implement or approve. But that begs
an additional question: should CEQA address climate change? Or,
to put the question more broadly, should we use environmental
assessment laws to help control GHG emissions? The answers are
not automatic, for laws like CEQA often provoke controversy and
debate. Some detractors argue that they primarily create cost and
delay and facilitate obstructionism.1 Others claim that they rely
Exchange, The Carbon Counter, www.carboncounter.org; Trading Hot Air, THE ECONOMIST,
Oct. 19, 2002 at 60 (describing the Chicago Climate Exchange); Goodell, supra note 200
(discussing the Chicago Climate Exchange, and also describing the reservations of some of
its critics); Driesen, supra note195, at 30-35 (describing the Kyoto Protocol's mechanisms for
emissions trading). Because of transparency issues, some of these offset sources might not
qualify as adequate mitigation under CEQA, but some organizations do provide
independently-verifiable offset projects. See Goodell, supra note 200 and text accompanying
note 203 (describing transparency concerns about the Chicago Climate Exchange).
212. If a project has significant environmental impacts that can be mitigated feasibly, the
agency cannot proceed with the project without such mitigation in place. If, however, the
project has significant adverse environmental impacts that cannot feasibly be mitigated, the
agency may proceed without mitigation so long as it adopts a "statement of overriding
considerations"justifying its decision. See City of Marina, 138 P.3d at 710.
213. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (describing offset costs).
214. See CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 5 ("time and again public sector
entities, companies, individuals and organizations have raised issues of cost and process
burdens").
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on a naively idealistic assumption that obligatory studies can
improve environmental outcomes.1 5 Even some NEPA and CEQA
proponents may view the laws as instruments of project derailment
rather than mechanisms for governmental improvement. 2 16  For
years, those critiques have provoked political and academic
defenses, many centering on the common-sense notion that it
seems reasonable to require agencies to disclose environmental
consequences before they finalize their actions, and it is perhaps
telling that legislative amendments never have significantly
weakened CEQA or NEPA.217 Nevertheless, skepticism about both
laws remains common.
That skepticism overlaps with common distrust of decentralized
environmental law enforcement. 218 Assessment laws like CEQA and
NEPA generally do not designate enforcement agencies, and
instead are enforced through the discretionary initiatives of
professional non-profit groups, ad-hoc citizens' groups, and state or
local governments. Such dispersed enforcement, though often
219hailed as one of environmental law's most effective innovations,
creates tensions with common conservative preferences for
consolidating public law enforcement authority within the
executive branch. 220  The geographic scope of climate change is
215. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NVEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 239
(1973) ("I think the emphasis on the redemptive quality of procedural reform is about nine
parts myth and one part coconut oil."). But see COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENY-FIVE YEARS iii
(1997) ("Overall, what we found is that NEPA is a success-it has made agencies take a hard
look at the potential environmental consequences of their actions, and it has brought the
public into the agency decision-making process like no other statute.").
216. See Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 339-41 (describing the perspective of a "NEPA
monkey wrencher").
217. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 25; Bear, supra note 25; COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY,
supra note 215. In a qualified defense, Professor Karkkainen argues that NEPA is less
valuable as an informational device and more valuable as a deterrent against approving
projects with potentially significant environmental impacts. See Karkkainen, supra note 25.
218. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) ("Vindicating the
public interest ... is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive."); Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881
(1983) (arguing that access to the courts should be limited in order to preserve executive
discretion and curtail "the judiciary's long love affair with environmental litigation").
219. See, e.g., Barton Thompson, The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. 185 (2000).
220. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 528 U.S. 167, 198, 210, 215
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The undesirable and unconstitutional consequence of today's
decision is to place the immense power of suing to enforce the public laws in private
hands.").
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likely to exacerbate those tensions; a belief that grievances affecting
broad swaths of society should not be addressed in the courts has
animated many objections to environmental litigation.2 1 Because
CEQA is a state law, and climate change is a national and
international problem, its application to climate change also could
conflict with trends toward limiting state environmental protection
authority. 222 Finally, even proponents of aggressive climate change
regulation may argue that a focus on any state law is misplaced and
that international arrangements alone hold the promise of
achieving genuine progress.223 Drawing upon those strains of
skepticism, litigants already have raised many arguments against
addressing climate change at any level besides the national
executive branch, and at any time before the national executive
branch is good and ready to act.2 4  CEQA litigation is likely to
arouse similar objections.
Critics also are likely to argue that CEQA-based regulation of
climate change is unnecessary, for California already has begun
developing a new statutory and regulatory framework for
addressing climate change-a framework that probably will
become more comprehensive than CEQA in some respects.225
Parallel arguments likely will arise as other jurisdictions create new
regulatory schemes. Even where no climate change legislation
exists, skeptics may argue that advocates should focus solely on
creating it, not on trying to invoke existing law.
Other regulatory programs do present advantages. While
221. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 59-60 (2005), reversed, Massachusetts v.
EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (Sentelle, J., concurring) ("The generalized public good that
petitioners seek is the thing of legislatures and presidents, not of courts.").
222. See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: the Perverse Mutation
of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 786-98 (2006).
223. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 53 (arguing that many state initiatives will accomplish
little and may actually be counterproductive (but also identifying arguments in favor of well-
constructed state arrangements)).
224. See, e.g., Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep Inc. v. Witherspoon, No. CV-F-04-6663, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26536, *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2005) (describing arguments made in the
automakers' challenge to California's regulation of automotive GHG emissions); Thomas W.
Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 319-28 (2005)
(describing, and ultimately rejecting, a foreign policy pre-emption argument; EPA
unsuccessfully deployed a similar argument in the Massachusetts v. EPA litigation. See 127 S.
Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007)); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (dismissing a nuisance claim on political question grounds); California v. General
Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007)
(following American Electric Power Co., and dismissing a nuisance case against automakers).
225. See supra Part II.B.3.
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environmental assessment laws generally govern only new
discretionary decisions by government agencies, statutes like AB 32
can address purely private actions and can regulate emissions that
follow solely from past decisions.226 The AB 32 program offers the
potential benefits of centralized regulation, including the
economies of workload and communication that generally follow
from delegating responsibility to a single agency. Agencies
implementing statutes like AB 32 also may have a diversity of
regulatory instruments at their disposal. For example, within the
few limits set by AB 32 and by traditional administrative law
constraints, CARB can ban practices or products, order monitoring
and reporting, establish markets, and generally select, apply, and
enforce whatever regulatory instruments it determines will achieve
the statutory caps most efficiently. 27  Under CEQA, by contrast,
each agency must perform its own studies, identify its own impacts,
generate its own avoidance or mitigation measures, and engage in
its own monitoring to ensure those measures' effectiveness, and no
centralized authority enforces those obligations. Finally, laws like
AB 32 offer the possibility of an enforceable cap on emissions,
which could be an important feature if, as is likely, domestic
climate change laws become part of the implementation
infrastructure for international emissions-reduction commitments.
Environmental assessment laws, by contrast, create no overall caps,
and their project-by-project applicability makes overall reductions
difficult to predict with any quantified specificity. A skeptic might
therefore ask what laws like CEQA really can add.
The answer, as explained below, is quite a lot. Even statutory
schemes that purport to be comprehensive-and AB 32 does not-
rarely function that way, and environmental assessment laws can
228help limit or compensate for the "slippage" that inevitably occurs.
Environmental assessment laws can adapt to new environmental
problems, and their amenability to dispersed enforcement allows a
breadth of coverage exceeding that achievable under a law
implemented solely through the efforts of a single agency. By
226. See County of Inyo v. Yorty, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 383-86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)
(considering CEQA's applicability to a change to an existing project).
227. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38560-74 (West Supp. 2007) (requiring the CARB to
establish an emissions-reduction program, but establishing few constraints on that program's
form).
228. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in
Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999).
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allowing broad flexibility in selecting mitigation measures and
alternatives, environmental assessment laws sometimes can improve
environmental outcomes and spur innovative management at
relatively low cost. The disclosure and dialogue they sometimes
succeed in compelling can also bolster other regulatory approaches
by providing regulatory agencies information and leverage
points.2 2 9  And since laws like AB 32 are rare, environmental
assessment laws can fill in where such complementary approaches
are non-existent. Neither CEQA nor any other environmental
assessment law is a regulatory panacea. Compliance does not come
free, and environmental assessment laws have by no means served
as perfect antidotes to poor environmental decision-making.230
Nevertheless, and as explained in more detail below, the potential
benefits of applying environmental assessment laws to climate
change are substantial, and at least in the context of climate
change, many of the standard objections have little force.
Environmental assessment laws therefore can provide valuable
tools, which agencies, judges, and legislators should not hesitate to
use.
A. The Necessity of Complementary Approaches
Individual statutes hardly ever provide comprehensive responses
to environmental problems. Sometimes this is by design, as
legislators attempt only a preliminary response, leaving
comprehensive regulation for a later date. Other gaps are
inadvertent and unwanted. Understanding the scientific or
economic foundations of a problem may prove difficult, and
consequent mistakes can lead legislators to choose ineffective or
229. One need not be a full-fledged "NEPA optimist," to use Professor Karkkainen's term,
to see some value in the acts' procedural requirements. Based on experience as a NEPA and
CEQA practitioner, the author thinks it is naive to suppose that environmental impact
studies or reports uniformly produce the kind of informed, open, pre-decisional dialogue for
which NEPA proponents traditionally hope. But NEPA and CEQA processes do often focus
attention on important environmental issues, create an imperfect but real forum for
dialogue, lead to both small and significant beneficial project changes, and sometimes stop
unwise projects from proceeding. See Adler, supra note 25 (describing a moderately
successful, and in this author's view typical, NEPA process).
230. See Sax, supra note 215 (conducting a case study in ineffectiveness).
231. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38550-51 (West Supp. 2007) (requiring
cutbacks only to 1990 emissions levels; a long-term solution probably will require significantly
greater reductions).
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insufficiently demanding regulatory instruments. 2 3 2  Funding
mechanisms may leave implementing agencies short of the
resources or leverage necessary to translate statutory aspirations
into actual achievement.2 3 3  New problems may emerge, or old
problems may prove more intractable than expected. 34 Executive
hostility to legislative mandates may result in those mandates simply
being ignored. These problems seem to be particularly recurrent
with first attempts at addressing problems. For example, the Clean
Air, Clean Water, and Endangered Species Acts all required several
iterations to reach their present form, and each, though highly
successful in some respects, has provided only incomplete
responses to the problems it was designed to resolve.2 " As
legislators begin drafting statutory remedies for climate change,
they may learn from that history, but sometimes they may also be
doomed to repeat it.
Exclusive reliance on one implementing agency or enforcement
mechanism exacerbates the potential for gaps. Environmental laws
are filled with provisions whose mandates long went un-enforced or
under-enforced, and with regulatory programs that agencies have
ignored or found themselves unable to implement.236 From unmet
232. For example, the State Implementation Plan-based regulatory system set up by the
Clean Air Act has widely failed to ensure compliance with air quality standards. The system
assumes that planning agencies will be able to predict with accuracy what regulatory
measures will achieve compliance with air quality standards, but in practice offering such
accurate predictions has often proved exceedingly difficult. SeeJames D. Fine & Dave Owen,
Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between Models and Participation in Environmental Law and
Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901 (2005).
233. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 466 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir.
2006) (considering, and rejecting, the Fish and Wildlife Service's decision to refrain from
listing a species because of an alleged funding shortage); Dave Owen, The Disappointing
History of the National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 11 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 711 (2003) (contrasting
Congressional aspirations for the National Marine Sanctuaries Act with actual achievements,
and attributing the discrepancies partly to funding shortages).
234. Classic examples of this problem include unanticipated but huge increases in
vehicle-miles traveled, which delayed Clean Air compliance by offsetting many of the gains
from the act's technology standards. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV:
The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REv. 515,
557-59 (2004).
235. As discussed in the following notes and cited sources, many Americans live in areas
that do not meet federal air quality standards; many American rivers do not comply with
water quality standards; and while few species living in the United States have gone extinct
since the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") was enacted, many have been listed, and few have
recovered enough to no longer need the ESA's protections.
236. See Thompson, supra note 219, at 189-90 (describing compliance gaps); see also
Farber, supra note 228 (same).
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Clean Air Act deadlines... to the troubled history of total maximum
231 239daily loads3 8 to the rarity of recovering endangered species,
environmental statutes provide numerous cautionary examples
demonstrating that just because a legislative body promulgates a
mandate does not mean the mandate will be fulfilled.' ° Sometimes
implementation falls short because regulated parties use litigation
to delay or block rulemaking or enforcement. 24' Politics and
budgets also create limits. Indeed, because of such limitations,
enforcement of mandates like the Clean Water Act's pollutant
discharge prohibitions have sometimes defaulted largely to private
242
organizations. Scientific uncertainties also can create
enforcement problems, as agencies struggle to assign responsibility
and overcome burdens of proof. Consequently, when regulators
confront any environmental problem, and particularly one with
which they have little prior experience, it is naive at best and
cynical at worst to suggest that all eggs can safely go in one
enforcement basket.
Similar gaps could easily emerge through the processes of
243implementing legislative responses to climate change.
California's AB 32, for example, though a landmark law, does not
purport to offer a complete response. Full compliance with the
237. See, e.g., Richard Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, 54 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBS. 311, 324 (1991) (describing failures
to achieve goals set by the Clean Air Act); Oliver A. Houck, More Unfinished Stories: Lucas,
Atlanta Coalition, and Palila/Sweet Home, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 331, 386-87 (2004) (same).
238. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1990)
(describing the troubled early history of Congressional attempts to impose water quality
standards); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water Quality-
Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,391, 10,401 (1997)
(describing later failures to implement the Clean Water Act's program for achieving
compliance with water quality standards).
239. Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the Endangered
Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1996) (describing the failure of the Endangered Species Act
to promote species recovery, despite statutory provisions ostensibly designed to achieve that
goal).
240. See Farber, supra note 228, at 299 (describing "slippage" as "a feature of
environmental law so ubiquitous that we take it for granted").
241. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response
to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997) (arguing that implementing rules are
blocked with excessive frequency).
242. See Thompson, supra note 219, at 199-200 (describing water quality enforcement
efforts by the Natural Resources Defense Council and others); Seidenfeld & Nugent, supra
note 27, at 285.
243. In fact, California has already experienced difficulty implementing climate change
legislation. See Arnie's Uphill Climb, supra note 102.
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statute would reduce California's GHG emissions only to 1990
levels, but even in 1990 California's emission levels were
unsustainable; experts predict that far steeper reductions will be
necessary to stabilize the climate. Consistent with that limited
goal, the statute expressly declines to occupy the regulatory field.245
Nor should full compliance, whether with AB 32 or with any
other climate change statute, be assumed. CARB, the agency
charged with implementing AB 32, has a poor record of attaining
compliance with state and federal standards for other air
pollutants.246 CARB's regulatory program may leave GHG sources
unaddressed, either because the agency finds those sources too
difficult, politically or practically, to regulate, or because it shies
away from regulating sources outside its areas of traditional
247
expertise. CARB may underestimate the degree of controls
necessary to achieve the statutory goal, or the likelihood of
obtaining compliance levels sufficient to fulfill those goals.24 s
Enforcement likewise could prove problematic, particularly if
budgetary, legal, or political constraints delay CARB's ability to
244. See MANAGING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, supra note 32, at 1-4 (stating that
"developed countries around the world will need to achieve" larger emissions reductions or
face "very dangerous consequences"); Exec. Order S-3-05, supra note 83 (requiring larger
emission cuts); Wigley, supra note 170, at 2285, 2288 (concluding that full compliance with
the Kyoto Protocol, which establishes reduction targets similar to those of AB 32, will make
only a small difference in climate change).
245. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38592(a) (West Supp. 2007) ("All state agencies shall
consider and implement strategies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions."); id. at §
38592(b) ("Nothing in this division shall relieve any person, entity, or public agency of
compliance with other applicable federal, state, or local laws or regulations, including state
air and water quality requirements, and other requirements for protecting public health or
the environment."); id. at § 38598 ("(a) Nothing in this division shall limit the existing
authority of a state entity to adopt and implement greenhouse gas emissions reduction
measures. (b) Nothing in this division shall relieve any state entity of its legal obligations to
comply with existing law or regulation.").
246. Under the planning provisions of the CAA, CARB was responsible for developing
plans to meet federal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-10. Despite CARB's efforts, air
pollutants in most parts of California continue to exceed these standards. See OUR
CHANGING CLIMATE, supra note 3, at 5 (describing California's present air quality problems).
247. For example, AB 32 implies that the State Board should focus initially on a subset of
sources, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38530(b) (1), and for reasons of practicality and
administrative efficiency the agency is likely to follow that directive. That means, however,
that many smaller or more diffuse sources may escape regulation under AB 32, at least
immediately and perhaps indefinitely, even though the aggregate effect of those smaller
sources could be quite large.
248. See Farber, supra note 228, at 315-16 (noting that standards may be set based on
erroneous assumptions of full compliance).
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promulgate a regulatory program. 249  None of these predictions
assume any bad faith in CARB's implementation; as Professors
DeShazo and Freeman explain, "[t]he task before the [CARB] is
enormous, and substantial uncertainty remains about all of the
hard issues ... ,,50 Nevertheless, this situation is far from atypical,
and the unfortunate reality is that first statutory attempts at
addressing major environmental problems, though indispensable,
often fall short of achieving statutory goals.251  The need for
252complementary approaches usually remains.
B. The Functional Advantages of Environmental Assessment Laws
For several reasons, and in several ways, environmental
assessment laws like CEQA can provide an important
complementary regulatory approach, and their breadth of coverage
and amenability to flexible compliance can facilitate effectiveness
where other regulatory approaches fall short.
1. Breadth of Coverage
Unlike traditional centralized regulatory approaches, which
typically focus on a limited set of problems, CEQA's scope is broad:
it addresses threats to "the environment."2 53  That breadth of
coverage allows adaptation to unanticipated environmental threats
and reduces the risk of interstitial coverage gaps, because CEQA
renders unnecessary debates about whether a particular type of
254environmental threat falls within the statutory scope. It likewise
249. See Thompson, supra note 219, at 190-92 (describing the challenges agencies face in
monitoring compliance).
250. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 7, at 1533.
251. That problem is not unique to statutes, or to the United States. See, e.g., Tim Dyson,
On Development, Demography and Climate Change: The End of the World as We Know It, 27
POPULATION & ENV'T. 117, 132-33 (2005), available at http://iussp2005.princeton.edu/
download.aspx?submissionld=50222 (describing the failure of many nations to meet their
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol).
252. Professors Freeman and Farber have put the point well: "success with every
environmental problem... requires not only a suite of complementary regulatory tools and
the coordination of multiple levels of government, but also a wide variety of informal
implementation mechanisms and the ongoing participation of key stakeholders." Jody
Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 798 (2005).
253. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 2100 1 (g), 21002, 21002.1 (West 2007).
254. Such questions are ubiquitous in environmental litigation, and cases often turn not
on whether a proposed action poses an environmental threat but rather on whether the
threat is addressed by the particular statutory provisions at issue. See, e.g., Sierra Club v.
Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980) (considering whether runoff qualified as a
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avoids questions, much like those underlying the recent
Massachusetts v. EPA litigation, about whether old statutes address
new problems-if the problem is environmental, CEQA applies. 55
That broad applicability can be invaluable in addressing a problem
like climate change, which derives from the contributions of a
diverse set of sources, not all of which CARB is likely to find the
authority, political capital, or financial resources to regulate.
CEQA, in short, can catch emissions that other regulatory
programs would likely miss.
CEQA's traditional amenability to dispersed enforcement also
provides a valuable backstop. CARB likely will face the same
financial and human resource limitations that have left other
regulatory agencies, including EPA, so heavily dependent upon
citizen suits.256 Enforcement personnel may be few and may know
little about most of the thousands of emissions-causing decisions
around the state. Budgets will be limited, and CARB may find it
has limited political capital to invest in enforcement actions likely
to provoke vociferous opposition. CEQA can ease that burden by
requiring other agencies to avoid GHG emissions without any
initial direction or rulemaking from CARB. 57 CARB also can use
CEQA to complement its own enforcement efforts. CEQA
processes can provide valuable information about emissions-
causing decisions, and a CARB or EPA comment letter identifying
deficiencies in an EIR's climate change discussion could spur
prompt compliance. Lead agencies (and judges) tend to pay
attention when expert agencies comment on problems with
environmental reviews, and such comments can impel lead
agencies to correct their environmental studies or bolster their
"point source" discharge subject to the Clean Water Act, with no suggestion that the point
source determination would reflect the presence or absence of environmental harm).
Likewise, some chemicals fall outside existing regulatory regimes not because they aren't
harmful, but because no rule yet addresses the threat they pose. Environmental assessment
laws generate their own threshold debates as well; most commonly, the key threshold
question is whether sufficient discretion exists to trigger the laws' remaining requirements.
See, e.g., Dept. of Trans. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004). But those laws at least
reach broadly enough to address any form of environmental threat.
255. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). The merits turned on the question, answered in the negative
by the D.C. Circuit but in the affirmative by the Supreme Court, whether CO, is a "pollutant"
subject to the Clean Air Act, not whether CO2 emissions are a cause of environmental
damage.
256. See Thompson, supra note 219, at 190-92 (describing those limitations).
257. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21006 ("The Legislature finds and declares that this
division is an integral part of any public agency's decisionmaking process .... .").
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mitigation measures."5 Even without such agency participation,
many projects will proceed under the watchful eye of community
groups willing to use the CEQA process independently.
CEQA's age also provides advantages. Until CARB drafts and
implements its regulatory program, no one will know how effective
it will be, but past experience strongly suggests that it will produce
mixed results, with areas of substantial progress but also significant
glitches and gaps. 9 Some key provisions may turn out to be
difficult to enforce, and others may be ignored until CARB or non-
governmental organizations establish a credible enforcement
threat.2 11 CEQA, by contrast, has existed for decades. State and
local agencies know its requirements and environmental groups,
local governments, and the attorney general's office all have
experience enforcing it. Courts are familiar with CEQA litigation
and evince a basic understanding of the statute's purposes and
goals.26' It is by no means a perfect tool for compelling
environmental compliance-between litigation costs and
deferential standards of review, the odds generally favor an agency
even where non-compliance exists262 -but it is at least a familiar
258. See Michael C. Blumm & Lawrence R. Brown, Pluralism and the Environment: The Role
of Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation, 14 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 277 (1990); Adler, supra note
25, at 303-05 (describing EPA's participation in a NEPA process).
259. See supra notes 231-52 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 245-251 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish & Game Comm., 939 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Cal.
1997) ("CEQA is to be interpreted 'to afford the fullest possible protection to the
environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.'") (quoting Friends of
Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049, 1056 (Cal. 1972)); Laurel Heights
Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278, 281 (Cal. 1988); Bakersfield
Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203, 232 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (emphasizing the costs of poor environmental review). The California Supreme Court
has resolved cases in favor of environmental petitioners with far greater frequency than the
U.S. Supreme Court, where no NEPA petitioner ever has won. SeeJason Czarnezki, Revisiting
the Tense Relationship Between the U.S. Supreme Court, Administrative Procedure, and the National
Environmental Policy Act, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 10 (2006); David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme
Court Hostile to NEPA ? Some Possible Explanationsfor a 12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL. L. 551 (1990).
262. While critiques of dispersed enforcement often seem premised upon the notion that
plaintiffs need only show up in court to stop a project, as though judges hand out injunctions
as readily as dentists provide toothbrushes, plaintiffs actually must take the risk of funding
litigation. This is generally no small task for a non-profit group facing the resources of a
government agency or private developer. The plaintiffs must tackle the difficult challenge of
overcoming both procedural objections and deferential review to show that the defendant
agency clearly did violate established law. See Buzbee, supra note 27, at 203 ("Citizen litigants
cannot even begin a case, let alone win it, unless their preferences comport with several
layers of political judgments that are part of duly enacted statutory law.... ."); CAL. PUB. RES.
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one capable of producing immediate results.
None of the foregoing suggests that environmental assessment
laws provide catch-all mechanisms for environmental protection.
Other regulatory approaches can respond to some threats-
particularly those deriving from completed projects-that
environmental assessment laws do not redress. Many advantages
follow from utilizing the centralized expertise and regulatory
culture of a single implementing agency, rather than depending on
the labors of many dispersed decision-makers, some of whom have
little expertise in or commitment to environmental protection.
The downside of dispersed enforcement can be uneven
enforcement, with lawsuits reflecting parochial concerns rather
than a coherent regulatory agenda. For all of these reasons, laws
like CEQA do not obviate the need for laws like AB 32. But
imperfection is the hallmark of environmental protection laws, and
so long as comprehensive statutory responses are unavailable,
reliance on complementary approaches will be indispensable to
efforts to resolve any substantial environmental problem. As role
players, if not the stars, in the game of environmental protection,
environmental assessment laws like CEQA can add essential
complements to a regulatory portfolio.
Likewise, none of the foregoing discussion suggests that laws like
CEQA obviate the need for a comprehensive and binding
international scheme. The coverage created by environmental
assessment laws, though in some ways extensive, is nowhere near
sufficient to create a comprehensive response to climate change.
But an international scheme, if ultimately enacted, still will require
implementing legislation to become effective. Treaty-based
emissions-reduction mandates are not likely to be self-executing
without subsidiary domestic legal structures.263 Laws like CEQA can
function as important parts of such implementing systems,
CODE § 21168.5 (West 2007) (establishing that judicial review "shall extend only to whether
there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion"); Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n, 764 P.2d at 283
(describing the deferential standards of review for CEQA cases). To actually obtain
injunctive relief, the violation generally also must have been prejudicial. CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 21005(b) (directing courts to "continue to follow the established principle that there
is no presumption that error is prejudicial"). Projects generally are enjoined, in other words,
only when it is fairly obvious that the approval process was illegal and a plaintiff had the
money, determination, and persistence to do something about it, not just because a plaintiff
woke up feeling litigious.
263. See, e.g., Dyson, supra note 251 (describing poor implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol).
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ensuring that they are more comprehensive and ultimately more
effective at achieving national or international reduction targets
than they would be if solely reliant on other regulatory approaches.
And in the period before an effective international system comes
into existence, laws like CEQA help fill the void.
2. The Feasibility and Flexibility of Compliance
Broad applicability and ready enforcement of a law are of little
benefit if the law is not effective or if the burdens it imposes dwarf
the benefits it produces. Some commentators have leveled just
such a critique at environmental disclosure laws like CEQA,
claiming that the information they produce is largely irrelevant to
actual decisions and that the costs of preparing environmental
studies do not justify the meager benefits produced. 64  Neither
critique applies particularly well to CEQA-based regulation of
climate change contributions, however, because the benefits are
important, and the burdens, though real, could be surprisingly
small. 165
a. Benefits
Most importantly, applying CEQA to climate change should limit
GHG emissions. CEQA's procedural incentives should discourage
projects with large emissions and encourage reformulation of
lower-emissions projects because procedural compliance will be
easier if lead agencies neutralize their GHG emissions. 266 Similarly,
CEQA's substantive mandate should ensure that even if agencies do
not limit emissions at the beginning of their processes, they will be
compelled to do so as a condition of project approval. While the
resulting limitations will not eliminate California's contributions to
climate change and will not address emissions from other states or
countries, even the imposition of incremental limits on a problem
264. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 215 (offering the irrelevance critique); CONGRESSIONAL TASK
FORCE, supra note 25, at 5 (summarizing the cost critique). But seeJoseph L. Sax, The Search
for Environmental Rights, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 93, 98 (1990) (reassessing irrelevance
critique and stating that NEPA does sometimes provide important opportunities for
participation).
265. What follows is not a quantitative cost-benefit analysis, which would be exceedingly
difficult for even a trained economist to produce. It instead is a qualitative discussion of the
likely benefits and burdens. But even that qualitative discussion should be sufficient to allow
useful comparisons.
266. See infra notes 275-277 and accompanying text.
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of such massive scale can create significant aggregate benefits. A
miniscule-percentage change in the risk of extreme weather events,
for example, can represent a significant number of lives saved if the
risk is borne by billions of people throughout the world. 67
Moreover, while one cannot simply presume that incremental
actions in places like California will spur complete resolution of
climate change problems-California's actions create few
constraints elsewhere 2 6 1-those local efforts can test policy
strategies, spur the development of mitigation technologies, and
defuse the common moral argument that until the U.S. reduces its
emissions, other nations have no obligation to reduce theirs.
CEQA also can improve the equity of other regulatory
approaches. Environmental regulation often creates thorny
fairness questions, particularly where a subset of contributors to a
problem is asked to bear all of the regulatory burdens. 269 Those
fairness concerns could be acute if regulation is left solely to CARB,
which may only have the political will and institutional capacity to
impose reductions upon a subset of sources while giving other new
sources a free ride. Because emissions-reduction mandates create a
zero-sum game, all new emissions created by non-regulated projects
will either push California further from achieving its reduction
targets or require greater sacrifices by those who fall under AB 32's
regulatory program. Regulated groups that might chafe at
differential treatment therefore ought to appreciate the more
inclusive approach allowed by CEQA.27 ° Some unevenness in the
267. Impact is generally a product of the change in risk and the extent of exposure.
Suppose a hypothetical project creates a risk increase of one additional death per billion
people per year, but the increased risk is felt among six billion people worldwide. While that
risk might seem negligible if it impacted only one hundred people, worldwide it would likely
cause an additional six deaths per year, an adverse outcome that might vastly outweigh the
benefits from the project.
268. To posit a possible causal relationship, however, is not implausible. California's
actions and innovations could help spur federal responses, and many commentators believe
no broadly-inclusive response will occur so long as American inertia provides a rhetorical
justification for inaction elsewhere. See Eveiybody's Green Now, THE ECONOMIST,June 2, 2007,
special report at 6, available at 2007 WLNR 10206078 ("If America continues to refuse to
control its carbon dioxide emissions at the federal level, there is no chance that countries
such as China and India, whose emissions will soon overtake America's, will control theirs.").
269. See Carol M. Rose, The Stoiy of Lucas: Environmental Land Use Regulation Between
Developers and the Deep Blue Sea, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES, supra note 27, at 237, 239
(describing how environmental regulation often becomes focused on a subset of the people
or entities responsible for environmental problems).
270. Those regulated by CEQA might see a different sort of unfairness: why, they might
ask, should their development be subject to a no-net-emissions requirement, when the ten-
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distribution of regulatory burdens is of course inherent in almost
any governmental action, and achieving perfect fairness in climate
change regulation will be impossible. But by broadening the scope
of coverage, CEQA can at least reduce the consequent "why-me?"
moments, when regulated parties claim they bear a
disproportionate share of regulatory burdens.27'
Compliance with CEQA's mandates can also generate other
significant collateral benefits. Limiting GHG emissions can spur
development of mitigation technologies, which in turn may boost
California's economy by turning the state into an incubator for
green research and development. 272 Should California then export
those technologies, the state may benefit doubly: first from the
economic benefits of its exports and again from consequent
reductions in GHG emissions elsewhere. Other secondary
economic and environmental benefits may follow from measures to
limit GHG emissions: Such measures often promote efficiency and
incidentally mitigate other potential environmental harms. For
example, reducing energy consumption saves money; minimizing
driving limits traffic, noise, and other pollutant emissions; and
reducing water consumption can leave more water in rivers,strea s, n .r 273
streams, and aquifers. Though the primary benefit of emissions
limitations almost always will be the consequent reduction in
year-old development down the street faced no such obligation? The availability of offsets
should somewhat mitigate that complaint, for grandfathered sources then become potential
sellers; if those grandfathered sources can reduce CO, emissions cheaply, they can be paid to
do so, and new projects may proceed at lower cost. But ultimately, the disparity arises from a
reality fairly common in environmental law: activities initiated before awareness of a problem
often receive more favorable treatment than activities initiated after the problem is widely
perceived. See Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, If Your Grandfather Can Pollute, So Can You:
Environmental "Grandfather Clauses" and their Role in Environmental Inequity, 45 CATH. U. L. REV.
131, 140-41 (citing multiple examples).
271. See Rose, supra note 269, at 260-61. This does not suggest that focused GHG
emissions regulation would be likely to effect a taking, but instead that it might offend the
fairness instincts that also motivate many takings claims.
272. See CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 65.
273. In fact, some of the potential collateral benefits are sufficiently significant that
environmental justice advocates have warned of the potential unfairness if emissions trading
regimes concentrate GHG-reduction efforts disproportionately in wealthy areas, while
leaving low-income communities unable to reap the beneficial consequences of localized
GHG reduction. E.g., DUTZIK & SARGENT, supra note 198, at 16-17. Not all emissions-
limitation strategies create win-win outcomes for the environment, however. For example,
while nuclear power plants produce hardly any greenhouse gas emissions, the waste they
produce has, as the D.C. Circuit explained, "the potential to devastate public health and the
environment." Nuclear Energy Inst. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
[Vol.33:1
2008] Climate Change and Environmental Assessment Laws 111
climate change, the collateral bonuses also can be significant.
b. Burdens
Though few people dispute the value of some environmental
protection, the most common critique of environmental assessment
laws alleges that compliance requires time and expense
disproportionate to any benefits received.7 4  Such critiques are
likely to be particularly prevalent where environmental assessment
laws apply to climate change. Why, critics will ask, should agencies
go through all the procedural hassle of EIR preparation, let alone
the financial cost of installing mitigation systems, to address GHG
sources that contribute only fractions of a percentage of the
worldwide output? In practice, however, those compliance burdens
can be lower than some critiques of environmental assessment laws
might suggest.
In most circumstances, proactive mitigation can minimize
procedural compliance costs. An agency must prepare a full EIR
only if its project may have significant adverse environmental
impacts. Therefore, by committing at the outset to full mitigation
of the project's contribution to any potentially significant impact,
the lead agency can proceed on the basis of a "mitigated negative
declaration," thus avoiding the expense and delay of EIR
preparation. 275 For example, if an agency's proposed project would
annually emit 100 tons of GHGs, but the agency commits to on-site
measures that avoid fifty tons of those emissions and purchases
offsets that verifiably balance the remaining fifty tons, the agency
will not be legally obligated to prepare an EIR (unless some other
potentially significant impact remains). The agency still must do
some work: It must prepare an "initial study," and a "mitigated
negative declaration," and in order to offset its GHG emissions, it
must calculate what those emissions will be. These obligations,
however, are significantly less extensive than those involved in
preparing a full-scale EIR.276 Consequently, for most CEQA
projects and for an overwhelming majority of NEPA projects, lead
agencies take exactly that course in addressing other
274. E.g., CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 5; Karkkainen, supra note 25, at
341-42 (describing this critique).
275. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15065(b)(1), 15369.5 (2005).
276. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081.6 (West 2007).
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environmental impacts.2 7   By adopting all feasible on-site
mitigation techniques and offsetting any potential impacts that
remain-something agencies will often be obligated to do anyway
211
at the end of the CEQA compliance process -agencies can
ensure that potential climate change contributions never create an
obligation to prepare an EIR.
Even when agencies do prepare EIRs, a discussion of climate
change contributions usually should add only moderately to the
resulting expense. Tools are available online for calculating
carbon footprints,2 9 and lead agencies also can piggyback their
GHG emissions calculations on work they already must do to
calculate energy consumption, s° traffic generation, and emissions
of other air pollutants.s Some projects will require more than a
ready-for-download analytical method, and some emissions may
remain difficult to calculate precisely.282  Nevertheless, as climate
change regulation becomes more widespread and as carbon
markets develop, the availability and sophistication of emissions-
28
assessment tools should only increase.   Likewise, discussions of
the aggregate effects284 of GHG emissions could be essentially
boilerplate. Every GHG-emitting project ultimately contributes to
277. See Karkkainen, supra note 109, at 932-37.
278. See infra Parts III.A.3, III.B.3.
279. See, e.g., California Climate Action Registry, Protocols, at http://www.climateregistry
.org/PROTOCOLS/ (last visited June 12, 2007) (providing links to protocols for assessing
emissions).
280. See CEQA Guidelines App. F, available at http://www.ceres.ca.gov/topic/envjaw/
ceqa/guidelines/AppendixF.html (last visitedJune 11, 2007).
281. The same fossil fuel combustion activities responsible for most of California's GHG
emissions also emit conventional pollutants like nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter, and
volatile organic compounds. Projects in non-attainment areas, which include most of
California, generally must address those emissions as part of EIR preparation. See, e.g., Kings
County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, 270 Cal. Rptr. 650, 660-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(addressing an EIR's discussion of pollutant emissions).
282. For example, calculating how land use changes will affect emissions may create some
tricky causality questions, and views may differ on the extent to which emissions can be
attributed to specific projects rather than background trends. But the fact that some
contributions are uncertain does not vitiate the obligation to discuss those contributions that
are reasonably foreseeable.
283. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38530 (West Supp. 2007) (providing for emissions
inventorying and monitoring).
284. The basic premise of a cumulative impacts analysis is that aggregate, not individual,
effects matter. An argument that a project's contribution cannot be significant because no
one can identify a specific temperature increase, storm event, or other environmental result
uniquely attributable to that project therefore would miss the whole point of the focus on
cumulative impacts.
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the same set of cumulative impacts, and those impacts are amply
described in a large and growing set of reports, many available on-
line and written to be accessible to lay audiences.85
Actual physical avoidance of GHG emissions is not cost-free, but
CEQA's substantive mandate comports with what many
environmental law scholars have described as a model method for
efficiently achieving environmental protection. Since the 1970s,
many legal and economic scholars have blasted technology-based,
"command-and-control" environmental laws as inefficient and
undemocratic. They argue that environmental laws instead should
define performance standards and allow regulated parties
flexibility, including access to emissions-trading systems, in
achieving those standards.2 6  Environmental markets, they argue,
and a willingness to allow diverse compliance mechanisms would
create innovation incentives, allow lower-cost allocations of
regulatory burdens, and focus government attention on more
fundamental questions about regulatory goals and allowable
pollutant levels rather than individual process technologies.8 7
Those critiques have been controversial, with other scholars
arguing that a traditional approach was reasonably functional, that
actual practice bore little correspondence to system described in
288the reformers' critique, or that the promise of markets is often
exaggerated. 2s9 Nevertheless, a restrained version of the reformers'
290
core argument seems intuitive and has some empirical support.
Market-based approaches often enjoy political support from groups
that otherwise might be hostile to regulation, and they pervade
285. See, e.g., IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 4; OUR
CHANGING CLIMATE, supra note 3; CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3.
286. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988). The
Ackerman and Stewart articles are part of a substantial body of similar scholarship.
287. See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, supra note 286; Ackerman &
Stewart, The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, supra note 286.
288. See Farber, supra note 228, at 316.
289. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards and 'Fine-tuning' Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985); see also Salzman &
Ruhl, supra note 197 (analyzing factors affecting the effectiveness of environmental trading
systems).
290. The most often-cited example of a successful market-based approach to
environmental regulation is the acid rain program enacted as part of the 1990 Clean Air Act
amendments. See, e.g., Salzman and Ruhl, supra note 197, at 621.
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proposals for climate change regulation.291
Though its enactment preceded the post-command-and-control
scholarship, CEQA's substantive mandate establishes a regulatory
methodology in some ways quite similar to what those reformers
advocated. It defines a functional standard for substantive
outcomes: projects shall not cause significant environmental
impacts if those impacts are feasibly avoidable. Other than
mandating that mitigation commitments be verifiable and
enforceable,23  however, it establishes few constraints on the
methods agencies use to achieve those goals. Agencies can re-
design projects, use any kind of on- or off-site mitigation, impose
technology controls, create market mechanisms and other
economic incentives, or invent some other technique. They just
have to show that their chosen mechanisms will work. Indeed,
many would argue that CEQA allows too much flexibility. It is
rarely easy to monitor whether mitigation actually is working,294 and
projects therefore may slide through the CEQA process based on
credible but ultimately inaccurate assurances that mitigation
programs will succeed. 295  But if stakeholders and courts remain
alert to the reality that real mitigation requires effective monitoring
and enforcement structures, 296 CEQA should allow creativity in
selecting or developing cost-effective mitigation techniques without
compromising environmental protection. Such flexibility cannot
eliminate procedural compliance costs, but it can reduce them.
291. MANAGING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, supra note 32, at ES-5 ("Emission offsets
provide an opportunity for cost-savings and economic development, and thus should be
included under conditions that reduce the prospects for fictional emissions reductions and
inefficient revenue transfers."); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 7, at 1540-45 (predicting
that environmentalists and industry will advocate cap-and-trade programs); Engel, supra note
163, at 1565 (arguing that offsets present efficiency advantages, and could also help spur the
development of a broader emissions market).
292. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081 (West 2007).
293. See City of Marina v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 138 P.3d 692, 707 (Cal. 2006).
294. CEQA requires agencies to develop programs to monitor the effectiveness of any
mitigation measures used to support a mitigated negative declaration, and requires that
those measures be "fully enforceable." See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081.6. Nevertheless,
attention to compliance with mitigation measures may be significandy less than attention to
initial decisions, and mitigation conditions may be modified or deleted if an agency finds
them "impracticable or unworkable." Lincoln Place Tenants Assn. v. City of Los Angeles, 31
Cal. Rptr. 3d. 353, 366-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
295. See Karkkainen, supra note 109, at 908 (identifying this threat with mitigated FONSIs,
which are the NEPA equivalent of mitigated negative declarations).
296. E.g., Lincoln Place Tenants Assn., 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 366-67 (finding illegal a city's
failure to comply with earlier mitigation measures); see CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081.6.
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That flexibility also can turn CEQA into an engine for
innovation. By requiring many agencies to comply but allowing
compliance in many different ways, CEQA can create incentives to
develop and sell innovative GHG-mitigation techniques or
technologies. It therefore can spur renewable-energy and green-
development businesses, potentially creating stronger domestic
markets for greenhouse mitigation products. 17  As climate
regulation progresses elsewhere, those technologies could be
marketed profitably beyond the state's borders.298 Such markets
could aid California in multiple ways-first, by boosting in-state
businesses, and second, by lowering barriers to emissions
limitations elsewhere.
C. The Logic of Non-Exclusive Local Control
The other likely objections to CEQA-based climate change
regulation address not the burdens or benefits of environmental
assessment laws, but rather the efficacy or even constitutionality of
addressing a global problem through localized legal regimes.
Local agencies, skeptics may suggest, have neither the authority nor
the competence to address a problem with so many international
dimensions, and response efforts ought to come from the federal
or even international level. In its most extreme version, the
argument suggests that local regulation will make climate change
worse: by regulating internally, California might reduce the federal
government's bargaining chips in international negotiations. 2 9 In
various forms, these theories have often been tested in climate
change litigation, and such tests are likely to continue. 0°
297. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (describing studies asserting that
climate change regulation will substantially benefit the California economy).
298. See id.
299. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438,
(2007) (No. 05-1120) (question from Justice Scalia) ("If we have done everything we can to
reduce CO2, you know, what deal do we make with foreign nations? What incentive do they
have to go along with us?"). That argument is difficult to square with the Bush
Administration's rhetorical endorsement of domestic emissions reductions. See Green Mtn.
Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 396 (D. Vt. 2007) ("The
United States has praised such efforts to the international community.").
300. See, e.g., Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep Inc. v. Witherspoon, No. CV-F-04-6663, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26536, *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2005) (describing arguments made in the
automakers' challenge to California's regulation of automotive GHG emissions);
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing a
nuisance claim on political question grounds); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007)
(rejecting standing arguments and arguments that presidential foreign policy powers
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Nevertheless, those critiques wither under close examination, for
CEQA asks local agencies only to analyze and address the
consequences of their own actions, a task that exceeds neither local
authority nor local competence.
While climate change is global, and climate change regulation
does have international dimensions, CEQA's provisions fall well
within the state's traditional regulatory power. CEQA governs only
actions taken within California. Neither the statutory text nor any
reported judicial decision purports to apply CEQA to decisions
made or actions taken beyond the state's borders. Moreover, the
triggers for CEQA's applicability-discretionary decisions by state
and local government agencies-should further preclude charges
of usurpation of other authority. 31 ' Absent directly contrary federal
authority, states clearly can control the actions of their own
political subdivisions, and federal jurisprudence has generally
protected that prerogative.
The fact that intrastate CEQA enforcement will limit cross-border
benefits provides no reason for limiting that authority. Local
actions clearly do have consequences outside California, and those
consequences explain in part the significance of GHG emissions
and the importance of addressing them.3  Nevertheless, a state law
with cross-border impact is not at all unprecedented; many air or
water pollution control rules benefit downwind or downstream
jurisdictions. Such rules also are not unfair or politically suspect.
While legal doctrines like the dormant commerce clause protect
against state actions that unfairly protect in-state interests at others'
expense, there is little reason to fear state laws that impose in-state
obligations and create out-of-state benefits.3 0 4  Such laws simply
require acting as a good neighbor.
Nor does CEQA's applicability to climate change threaten to
improperly interject state or local agencies into international
affairs. As a legal matter, state action does not constrain the ability
allowed EPA to avoid regulating GHG emissions); Friends of the Earth v. Watson, No. C 02-
4106, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 42335 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (rejecting a challenge to the
plaintiffs' standing).
301. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(g), 21002, 21002.1 (West 2007) (directing CEQA's
mandates at the conduct of state and local agencies).
302. See, e.g., NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
303. See IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4 (explaining those effects, and
how they come about).
304. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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of the federal government or of other nations to act on a broader
scale. As a practical matter, state-based climate change regulation
obviously does have some international effects-that is partly the
point-but the mere existence of such effects does not imply any
improper intrusion into foreign policy. Almost any state law could
conceivably have some international effect, and few people would
suggest that states should forfeit their police powers if exercising
those powers might have a negative effect on trade, immigration, or
some other subject of international discussion. 3 5 The effects also
may not be negative. California's efforts to curb GHG emissions
may encourage efforts in China, India, or elsewhere; technological
innovations may help lower the cost of reducing emissions
elsewhere and thus reduce opposition to regulation. At the very
least, such efforts may blunt arguments that America is in no moral
position to ask other countries to act.
3
0
6
Though the ultimate problem is in some ways global, the analyses
required by CEQA also fall within the traditional realm of local
agencies. With occasional assistance from agencies expert in air
quality management, those local agencies generally will be well
positioned to predict the quantity of GHGs their own projects
could emit and to devise methods for avoiding such emissions.307
They are likely to be more familiar with proposed projects than any
other governmental entity, and traditionally they are responsible
for predicting the traffic patterns, energy consumption, and other
308
consequences that follow from their planning decisions.
Establishing the link between emissions and the larger problem of
climate change has become similarly straightforward; local officials
can simply rely on any one of an increasing number of reports
prepared for policy-making audiences.0 9
305. See generally Merrill, supra note 224, at 328 (discussing federal nuisance claims: "A
suit brought by legal officers of American States against American defendants under a cause
of action based on American common law is not pre-empted just because a favorable
outcome in the action might have reverberations or ramifications for the conduct of
American foreign policy.").
306. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 268, at 6 (asserting that China will do nothing
significant if the U.S. does not act first).
307. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of expert agencies
to influence CEQA and NEPA processes by submitting comments).
308. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4; OUR CHANGING CLIMATE,
supra note 3; MANAGING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, supra note 32; PEW CENTER FOR
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 31.
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IV. CONCLUSION
To date, academic discourse has given very little attention to the
role environmental assessment laws could play in responding to
climate change. While practicing lawyers are increasingly testing
that possibility,1 0 academics have primarily focused on the
possibility of new legal regimes. Moreover, academic inquiry into
traditional legal mechanisms has largely focused on the tort
system. 31 ' Among scholars, if not among the bar, the possibility that
laws like CEQA or NEPA could help has generally been ignored.
The lack of focus on environmental assessment laws is not
entirely surprising; as this article has explained, those laws cannot
provide a stand-alone response to climate change. The creation of
new legal mechanisms and the use of a range of other, older
mechanisms will likely prove necessary to any sort of
comprehensive response. The various frustrations with
environmental assessment laws generally, and with NEPA in
particular, may also explain why academics have focused their
attention elsewhere. Many policymakers view these laws as
procedurally onerous and many environmental advocates consider
them substantively weak. The group that views the laws as
important mechanisms for major change, though it exists, is
probably small 3 2
Nevertheless, environmental assessment laws can play an
important and valuable role. California's CEQA provides a good
example of the possibilities. By requiring government agencies to
disclose their projects' potential contributions to climate change,
CEQA can generate information about sources of GHG emissions.
Its procedural requirements create powerful incentives toward
minimizing or offsetting those emissions; if the agency can avoid or
neutralize a project's contribution, no EIR will be necessary. By
requiring implementation of feasible mitigation, CEQA adds
prohibition to incentive. Through its scope of coverage and
traditional amenability to dispersed enforcement, CEQA extends
its requirements broadly. Despite establishing those strong
310. See Gerrard, supra note 21 (describing pending litigation).
311. E.g. Engel, supra note 163 (considering tort remedies); Merrill, supra note 224.
312. See Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 338-42 (describing perspectives on NEPA); Sax,
supra note 215, at 239.
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prohibitions, CEQA also reserves flexibility and allows agencies
broad discretion in choosing mitigation measures. In sum, those
features can reduce emissions while allowing reductions to occur in
creative, low-cost ways.
CEQA's mandates still do not add up to a comprehensive
regulatory scheme. Some other approaches will be necessary to
address existing emissions sources and to fill the gaps where CEQA
compliance slips. But if even moderately well-enforced, laws like
CEQA can change many projects, some in small and some in major
ways. They can help turn emissions minimization into a more
pervasive societal practice, and can thus provide valuable
complements to other regulatory approaches.

